Child Care Mess Illustrates Why Canada Needs a Policy Revolution
By Gregory D. Morrow

If there was ever an illustration of why campaigns don’t make for producers of good policy it is the child care mess in which Canada finds itself following last month’s election. Let me be clear about my feelings: neither of the the options that were presented by the Liberals (a program to provide child care spaces to low-income earners) or the Conservatives (a $100-a-month allowance for each child under 6 years old) are sufficient in and of themselves. This false dichotomy is the result of campaign strategies that were intended to show the differences between the two parties. Unfortunately, both are merely partial solutions that benefit only fragments of the population.

The Conservative $100-a-month plan is being touted as giving parents “choice”. Giving parents choice is exactly what is needed, unforunately, the $100-a-month plan doesn’t do that. No doubt every Canadian would like a break on their taxes, and nobody needs this break more so than parents. So, the revamped baby bonus is a win for all families. But with an average cost of $8,700-per-year for a single child care space, a $1,200-per-year subsidy will not help low- or even middle-class earners pay for child care. For example, someone earning $20-per-hour would still need to spend over 20% of their gross earnings on child care, even after the $1,200 subsidy is factored in. A minimum-wage earner in Ontario ($7.45-per-hour) would need to spend more than 50% of gross earnings on child care, after the $1,200 subsidy is factored in. These levels of spending are impossible. There is no doubt that the $1,200-per-year allowance will help parents pay the bills and provide for their kids better. But based on the numbers, it will not provide nearly enough money to pay for child care. So the Conservative plan by itself is only a partial solution.

The Liberal plan is also flawed. A network of subsidized child care centres only benefits a select segment of the population: a) the lowest 20% of income earners, since the program can only meet the need of 1 in 5 who want a child care space, b) those that live in an area that is sufficiently urbanized that it is convenient for parents to drop off their kids and c) those that want to send their kid to child care, rather than stay at home themselves. In other words, people that don’t live in a dense urban region (or happen to live close to the centre) will not benefit from the child care centres. And, anyone earning more than about $20-per-hour will not see a benefit because the spaces will be given to those most in need. Moreover, parents who choose to stay home with their kids before they go to kindergarten (more and more a luxury these days) will also not benefit from subsidized spaces. So the Liberal plan by itself is only a partial solution.

It is clear that both programs have merits, but operating by themselves, they are woefully inadequate as a means of providing much needed child care. Child care is not merely a social program, but it is also a vital tool to drive economic growth and increase productivity. Child care allows those who want to work and have kids to continue their careers. Child care also allows parents to further their training in order to get better jobs and be more self reliant. The Liberals dismissed criticism of their plan because they were looking out for low-income earners (since only the lowest 20% get spaces), while the Conservative plan benefits middle- and upper-middle income earners the most (yes, $1,200 will surely help low-income earners pay the bills, but is nowhere near what is needed to pay for child care).

There is a simple solution that gives parents real choice … wait for it … how about let parents choose which option best suits them? Revolutionary, I know. Why not have a system of subsidized child care centres and let people choose whether they want a subsidize child care space or the $1,200-per-year subsidy. For those that choose parents who don’t want to send their kids to child care, they would choose the $1,200-per-year allowance. Folks who live too far from a child care centre would alos choose the $1,200-per-year allowance. But, for those low-income earners for whom $1,200 will not be nearly enough to buy child care, and who live close enough to a child care centre, they would choose — and be given first dibs on — the subsidized child care spaces. If there are not enough spaces to meet the demand from among those who choose the subsidized space option, those parents would receive the $1,200 allowance.

It is the best of both worlds. I discussed a variation of this in an article on 7 December 2005 (“An Innovative Canadian Child Care Plan”) - see the article for how the numbers play out. Parents who choose not to send their kids to school get the same benefit as the Conservative plan. Ditto for rural dwellers or those that don’t live close to a centre. However, those who need child care the most — low-wage parents who live in cities (where costs of living are highest) would have the benefit of subsidized child care in order to work or go back to school.

If we had a better system of developing policies in Canada — that is, if political parties actually went community-by-community and talked with people in different situations — we might very well have arrived at such a common sense solution. One-size does not fit all — not a $1,200 allowance nor a subsidized space. If policy was developed bottom-up, hand-in-hand with communities instead of the brainchild of top-down policy wonks, Canada’s parents would really have choice on child care.

NDP Must Return to Grassroots Organizing
By Gregory D. Morrow

In his classic study Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy (New York: Free Press, [1911] 1962) [Note: 891kb PDF] Robert Michels argues that “organization is the weapon of the weak in the struggle with the strong” but also that “organization is … the source from which the conservative currents flow over the plain of democracy, occasioning there disastrous floods and rendering the plain unrecognizable.” ([1911] 1962, pp. 61-62; or pp. 19-20 in above PDF). In other words, any attempt to achieve social/political change will ultimately result in a form of organization that mimicks the very institutional structure it hopes to change. The logic, as summarized by Elisabeth Clemens in her 1993 article “Organizational Repertoires and Institutional Change: Women’s Groups and the Transformation of U.S. Politics, 1890-1920,” [The American Journal of Sociology, (98):3, pp. 755-98] [Note: 2.4mb PDF] is as follows:

1) hierarchical, centralized bureaucracies are the most effective form of organization;
2) consequently, existing political parties and institutions have adopted this form of organization;
3) in the course of pursuing their ends, oppositional parties will adopt the same organizational form for strategic reasons, even at the expense of their ideological commitments;
4) therefore, [this] will lead oppositional parties to become like established political groups, precluding the possibility of meaningful political change. (Clemens, 1993, p. 768)

This is precisely the paradox in which Canada’s New Democratic Party finds itself. A party whose origins are clearly tied to a populist and grassroots social movement has come to mimick the organizational structure of Canada’s two major parties — a centralized, bureaucratic and hierarchical structure that is viewed as the most effective means of organizing political action.

And this NDP centralization of policy and organization has not been without its successes when the Party finds itself with the balance of power in minority governments - a position that the NDP has enjoyed on a few occasions in its 40-year history. But Michels’ thesis illustrates the paradox faced by social movements such as the one that created the CCF-NDP.

In particular, he contends that by competing in elections, oppositional parties that are organized centrally would be drawn toward the political center and, thereby, moderate their radical goals. And if such actions don’t yield positive electoral results, he suggests that a party would subsequently adopt strategies that emphasize ideological purity or solidary rather than electoral advantage (1962, pp. 334-5). As Elisabeth Clemens explains, for a centrally organized revolutionary party, “the requirements of training cadres may well outweigh the advantages of a large membership” (1993, p. 766).

The NDP clearly suffers from this unfortunate paradox — a party of social change whose electoral results have never quite matched their high expectations (or popular support), which subsequently leads to a period of soul-searching in which the party seeks to differentiate itself further from its closest ideological rival, the Liberals. This cycle repeats more or less consistently following each election.

I would argue that this period of self-reflection would be more fruitful if, instead of it re-evaluating policy positions, the NDP re-evaluated the organizational structure through which party policy and campaign strategies are formulated. In a nutshell, I would argue that because the NDP has co-opted the hierarchical organizational structure of bureaucratic and centralized institutions (those used by the very political and corporate elites they hope to supplant), it has become not more, but less, effective at mobilizing its supporters. This leads inevitably to electoral disappointment.

To be sure, the NDP suffers from the injustices of an electoral system that necessitates concentrations of support over broad-based support, and surely the NDP must continue to fight for electoral reform to redress how votes are translated into seats. Yet the NDP executive must also re-examine its own institutional structure and ask itself whether a more decentralized, regional, issue-targeted and bottom-up organization wouldn’t be more effective at electing members to fight for progressive values. In other words, the current top-down structure — where policies are set by a central executive (and voted upon by the chosen few delegates who are allowed to attend the party convention) — represents a significant departure from the grassroots movement that gave birth to the Party.

Through a careful study of women’s groups in the late nineteenth/early twentieth centuries, Clemens demonstrates the effectiveness of women organizers in achieving social change precisely not by adopting a centralized hierarchical organizational structure but by drawing upon a multiplicity (a repertoire) of strategies that mobilized support around specific issues. The progressive movement of today could learn much from the women’s movement of the late nineteenth/early twentieth century. Clemens argues convincingly that “the chosen model of collective action shapes alliances with other groups and relations with political institutions.” (p. 771). For the NDP to offer Canadians a real alternative in Canadian politics, they must strive to return to a grassroots bottom-up form of organization.

I suggested in an October 5, 2005 article that the NDP adopt a “charrette” process to develop party policies - a process that has been pioneered in the urban planning field but has vast potential for arriving at solutions to broader issues of public policy. Feel free to read that article:

http://democraticspace.com/blog/2005/10/ndp-strategy-part-iii-develop-party-policies-from-the-grassroots/

This charrette process of policy formation and political organization would go a long way towards raising the profile of the NDP in local communities and illustrating to the population that a vote for the NDP is a vote for real change. Of course, this will necessitate a reversal of years of technocratic public policy analysis that has been characterized by “modern” methods. But it is necessary in order to engage citizens in crafting solutions to problems of the day. Increasing political participation cannot be limited to increasing the voter turnout at election time. It must strive to engage citizens between elections as well. One point of clarification: given that most voters (about 60-65%) cast their ballot on the basis of the party, rather than by party leader (20-25%) or local candidate (15-20%), it is important to recognize that the fate of local candidates is in large measure tied to the fate of the national campaign. The charrette process to which I refer is not meant primarily to address local issues (even though at its roots it is a local process), but rather what I am suggesting is adapting the charrette model to engage citizens in the formation of federal NDP policy - the full range of national issues from healthcare, to the environment, taxes, education, foreign policy, etc.

The recent defection and subsequent cabinet appointment of Liberal David Emerson to the Conservative cabinet (perverting the democratic will of constituents of Vancouver-Kingsway) and the appointment of the unelected Michael Fortier as Minister of Public Works (the department synonymous with the Sponsorship scandal) illustrates the undemocratic nature of the bureaucratic and centralized organizational structure of Canada’s elites.

If the NDP is to differentiate itself from the other main parties, it will not be on the basis of policy; rather, it will be on the way that policies and strategies are formed. In this, the NDP has the power to control its destiny. A return to grassroots through a charrette process of policy formation and political organization will send a message of real change, creating a platform that is not only for the people, but crafted by the people. Heeding the warning that Michels issued a century ago, and learning from the experiences that Clemens outlines from the women’s movement, the NDP’s best chances are in returning to grassroots organizing. It is through de-centralized, regional, and issue-specific organization, not through centralized, hierarchical and bureaucratic organization that progressive organizations such as the NDP can become, as Michels suggested, “the weapon of the weak in the struggle with the strong”.

Note: the two PDFs linked to this page (Michels and Clemens) are under copyright. By downloading them, you agree not to distribute or reproduce them in any form.

Who Has the Power? Portlands Energy Centre Shows Short-Term Thinking
By Gregory D. Morrow

Rather than build a short-term stop-gap measure, the Ontario Power Generation (OPG) Corporation should increase the incoming line capacity for Toronto and undertake a major power generation plant in a location that can generate much more capacity than what is being proposed on Toronto’s Portlands. This is what is required in the long-term, because the proposed Portlands plant will only fill the City’s needs for about 4 years at which time we will be having the same debate over Toronto’s energy shortfall. Given the difficulty getting the Portlands plant online in 2 years (when Toronto will face a shortfall), the increased line capacity will allow the import of power in the short-term, and will be in place when new province-wide capacity is built in the years ahead (which will be necessary regardless of the fate of the Portlands). It’s a smarter choice for Toronto.

The Province of Ontario has announced plans to build a brand new power plant in downtown Toronto. Facing a shortfall of energy in the coming years, everyone agrees that Toronto needs power. However, short-term reactionary thinking cannot replace long-term planning. This statement from the Star article sums it up pretty well:

“Toronto’s hydro crunch forced the province into an about-face as Energy Minister Donna Cansfield ordered a controversial new electricity plant — rejected last year as too pricey — built on the waterfront.”

I typically agree with the Toronto Star editorial board on many issues. But on this issue, I disagree with their support of the project. The Portlands plant runs counter to local planning waterfront revitalization planning efforts, which have been on-going for several years — a redevelopment plan that will net the city’s millions in additional tax revenue. Not only will the plant be built, but the Province has decided that the existing out-of-service plant (the Hearn plant at 440 Unwin Ave) is too small to fit the bill, so an entirely new plant will be built immediately adjacent. Toronto Mayor David Miller recognizes the need for power, but is hoping to combine conservation with a retrofit of the Hearn plant instead of the construction of a new one.

It’s important to understand that the new plant would generate only 550 MW of power. Estimates indicate the City needs to find an additional 250 MW of power by 2008 and 500 MW by 2010. Thus, the Portlands plant will just meet Toronto’s needs for 4 years, at which time we will once again face an energy shortfall. The Portlands project represents just a 2.4% increase over the current 22,900 MW of capacity in Ontario. Moreover, given Ontario peak demand is 25,000 MW, the Portlands project will not prevent Ontario from needing to import power at peak times. OPG has a nice summary of its generating capacity on its website. Here’s an overview of their production sources:

I also seriously question whether OPG can actually build the Portlands Energy Centre in time to meet the expected 2008 shortfall. Two years is ridiculously short. I am skeptical as to whether the proper environmental assessments can be followed, given the time crunch. Certainly, opposition to the plan will make that even more challenging. Inevitably, the Province and the OPG will have to cast aside a democratic process in the name of expediency.

The real limitation to Toronto’s power supply is the capacity of the power lines coming into the city, and the overall shortage of capacity in Ontario. A plan that expands the incoming line capacity coupled with a substantial new generation plant in the Province would be a more sensible plan that would be effective in meeting the long-term needs of Toronto. While I have serious reservations about nuclear power, the 3 inactive generators at Pickering A have about three times the capacity (1545 MW) of the proposed Portlands plant, and already have the necessary lines in place.

The politics of power will certainly be in play. No community wants a power plant. Be that as it may, Pickering station has been in place for over 3 decades and given the lifespan of the existing reactors at Pickering, they will need to be replaced or upgraded within then next 20 years anyway.

Ontario needs to start thinking big and long-term. Increasing line capacity into Toronto will allow the Province, in the short term, to import power for fill the immediate short-term gap. Even if the Portlands project goes forward, it is doubtful it will be operational in time. Moreover, with a major re-investment in power province-wide, the new line capacity will be in place to meet Toronto’s needs. Long-term planning, not short-term stop-gap measures, should be the goal.

One of the most difficult things to grasp for an urban designer or urban planner is scale. It is often very surprising to compare the size of different cities, neighborhoods or university campuses side-by-side at the same scale. With the advent of Google Earth, comparing aerial photos is easy. I’ve posted some interesting examples of cities, neighborhoods and campuses.

The following are Google Earth aerial photos of several university campuses from 4,000 feet above the surface - i.e. they are all at the same scale. [Click image for large (1.3mb) image - these are about 1.3mb each. Click on university name for campus map]

MIT

HARVARD

UCLA

BERKELEY

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO

UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (364kb PDF)

The following are Google Earth aerial photos of several university campus cores from 2,000 feet above the surface - i.e. they are all at the same scale. [Click image for large (1.3mb) image - these are about 1.3mb each. Click on university name for campus map]

MIT

HARVARD

UCLA

BERKELEY

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO

UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (364kb PDF)

The following are Google Earth aerial photos from 10,000 feet above the surface - i.e. they are all at the same scale. [Click image for large (1.3mb) image - these are about 1.3mb each. Click on place name for Google map]

TORONTO, ONTARIO

OTTAWA, ONTARIO

VANCOUVER, BRITISH COLUMBIA

CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS

HOLLYWOOD, CALIFORNIA

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

The following are Google Earth aerial photos from 10 miles above the surface - i.e. they are all at the same scale. [Click image for large (1.3mb) image - these are about 1.3mb each. Click on place name for Google map]

CLOYNE, ONTARIO
Note: This is where I was raised (population: 70).

KINGSTON, ONTARIO

TORONTO, ONTARIO

OTTAWA, ONTARIO

VANCOUVER, BRITISH COLUMBIA

CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS

HOLLYWOOD, CALIFORNIA

SANTA MONICA, CALIFORNIA

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

NDP Wrong to Expel Buzz Hargrove
By Gregory D. Morrow

The Ontario NDP has expelled Canadian Auto Workers Union President Buzz Hargrove from the party, revoking the party membership that he has held for 41 years, ostensibly because he told voters in the federal election to “vote Liberal where the NDP cannot win.” (in other words: vote NDP, but where they cannot win, vote Liberal). I believe his expulsion is a both a strategic and democratic mistake. One must seriously question the purpose of expelling a prominent — and arguably very influential — party member such as Hargrove.

On first glance, it appears to be a case of sour grapes. Orthodox NDPers cringed when Hargrove and Paul Martin appeared together during the election. Kicking him out of the party appears to be their way of achieving retributive justice. And while it might make the party executive feel better, ejecting the leader of the nation’s largest union without letting him know of their potential actions or giving him a chance to defend himself will almost certainly cost them union votes.

Hargrove was kicked out for endorsing strategic voting — voting for your second choice (in this case, Liberal) where it is apparent that your first choice (NDP) cannot win. As I’ve said many times, strategic voting is problematic, but it is a reality given our flawed first-past-the-post system. The federal NDP had the opportunity to use its leverage in the 38th parliament to demand electoral reform in exchange for its support. It choose not to, instead asking for a vague covenant from the Liberals to block private healthcare (to me, the whole charade ended up looking like an election ploy to paint the Liberals as pro-private healthcare). In light of the NDP not insisting on a more representative electoral system, people like Hargrove fell back on strategic voting in order to maximize the party’s chances to gain seats (and to minimize the Tory chances to gain seats).

Moreover, it is not surprising that Hargrove would want to work with the Liberals. Only the Liberals or Conservatives had (or have) enough broad-base support in all regions in order to form the government. The NDP is not there yet. The Conservatives have said explicitly they would cut all corporate subsidies. The Liberals, by contrast, are willing to work with Ford, Chrysler, GM, among others, to ensure the survival of Canadian auto plants. So, it is in the interest of Hargrove and his constitutents (Canadian Auto Workers) to block the Tories. Buzz was, quite simply, doing his job. If a Conservative government cuts off incentives to the big three, and people lose their jobs, how does that benefit the NDP? Hargrove wanted want all many NDPers wanted: a Liberal-NDP minority government.

Further still, Hargrove’s endorsement of strategic voting worked both ways. Yes, he endorsed voting Liberal in ridings where the NDP had no chance of winning. But, there is evidence to suggest that Liberals also voted strategically for the NDP. Take Edmonton-Strathcona, for example. If voters here followed the pattern in Alberta, the results would have been: Tories 43%, NDP 26%, Liberals 22%. However, a strong candidate (Linda Duncan) and strategic voting tilted the vote slightly more towards the NDP. The final results were: Tories 42%, NDP 32%, Liberals 18%. Thus, it could be surmised that 1 in 6 Liberals strategically voted for the NDP. The NDP didn’t win, but they certainly made it competitive. Overall, DemocraticSPACE projected the NDP to win 29 seats. They won 29 seats. I see no evidence to suggest the NDP lost seats due to strategic voting.

The bigger question in the fallout of Hargrove’s explusion is whether the NDP can tolerate a diversity of voices within its ranks. Hargrove supported the NDP and its policies. But, he also recognized the need to block the Tories. For this, he lost his membership. His ejection follows on the NDP stripping Bev Desjarlais of her critic portfolio for not voting in favour of gay marriage last year (and subsequently, she lost the Churchill nomination — the seat was, in turn, won by Liberal Tina Keeper). Many NDP members felt very strongly that Bev should be kicked out of the party for not supporting a basic human right like marriage. She was labeled a bigot and vilified. I certainly think you can disagree with Bev’s decision to vote against gay marriage, but the rabid response, officially and among the membership, suggests an organization that not only expects but demands an orthodox endorsement of all party policies, all the time. I wonder whether this demand is consistent with the basic tenets of democracy, which is advanced through the genuine debate of issues.

The ejection of Desjarlais and Hargrove raises questions about the degree of dissent allowed within the NDP. For example, would a community organizer working to deliver more affordable housing be vilified if he or she suggested the best means of achieving that is by providing incentives to developers (a point that the evidence supports)? In this case, the policy of fighting for more affordable housing is consistent with the NDP’s aims, but the means of achieving that outcome — working through private means — does not. Would a public transit advocate be vilified for supporting Toronto’s Pearson-Union Station rail link, even if it meant adversely affecting the taxicab union or going against the adjacent community because they don’t want the noise? Or what about a community activist who supports setting up a private (but non-profit) health facility? Certainly the non-profit status would be supported by most NDPers, but there are those within the party that see any delivery of health services outside the public sector as a betrayal of the faith. The point here is not to criticize the NDP, but to raise legitimate questions about the inherent tension between the party apparatus and the principles of democracy (which should be of particular import to a party called the New DEMOCRATIC Party). Democracy is the free expression of differences of opinion. But when opinions don’t necessarily match 100% with party policy, is it acceptable to expel those who hold those dissenting views?

These are not easy questions. Yet the expulsion of Canadian Auto Worker President Buzz Hargrove does little but satisfy the more vindictive elements within the party. The message is clear: stay on message or get out. Surely, democracy deserves better. And surely the New Democratic Party can do better.

Some good stuff out there on the Emerson-Fortier fiasco. Hat tips to the following:

Coyne has a great piece that I would agree with. The money quote:

“Quite apart from whether floor-crossing should be allowed or not, we want our MPs at all times to be acting on principle, and not for personal gain. It’s always possible that a member may wish to join the government side out of genuine principle, and for that reason I don’t think you want to ban floor-crossing outright. But there needs to be some check applied to it, some test, some means of winnowing principle from self-interest. That is a judgment probably best left to the voters.”

CalgaryGrit posted some revealing numbers related to Emerson (courtesy of CTV):

(Among Liberal voters) Who did you vote for?
23% Emerson
62% Liberals
10% both

(Among Liberal voters) Would you vote for Emerson if he’d run as a Tory?
11% yes
76% no

Should there be a bi-election?
61% yes
23% no

Again Coyne, citing a National Post article, points out that despite the rhetoric that Michael Fortier was appointed to represent Montreal in cabinet, his Senate seat actually contain no part of Montreal.

PoliticalStaples on Emerson cancelling his teleconference the other day.

Edit: one more from Coyne, who has covered the Emerson-Fortier story with professionalism. The money quote:

“A leader’s job is not to give people what they want, or to tell them what they need: it is to persuade them to want what they need. Trust is a critical element in that. Indeed, it is indispensible.”