Anyone who has read my past comments on electoral reform knows by now that I favour changing our electoral system, and, in particular, I favour a mixed-member proportional (henceforth MMP) system. Up to now, I have remained silent until the Ontario Citizens’ Assembly (henceforth OCA) completes its MMP model. Now that we know what the OCA’s model looks like — 90 local seats, 39 regional seats, 129 total seats, province-wide closed list, overhangs allowed, I think it is fair to pass judgment. And I do so with the greatest of urgency, because I believe quite strongly that some of the decisions the OCA made in designing its MMP model will have grave consequences on its ability to pass a fall referendum. In fact, in its current form, I highly doubt it will gain the necessary 60% support (it may even have trouble getting 50%). Why is that?
The central problem lies in the OCA’s decision to have the proportional seats assigned from closed province-wide party lists where voters have no say in which list MPP is elected, instead of having open, regional slates of candidates from which voters choose their preferred candidate(s). It’s a critical flaw in the OCA’s MMP model and runs precisely counter to what Ontarians at consultation meetings across the province said — which was that they did not want closed lists.
And yet, the Citizens Assembly could easily recommend regional open lists with relatively small changes to their model. The result would be vastly improved voter choice and vastly improved accountability. And that’s what Ontarians want. The OCA has designed a system with 90 local seats, which I believe this is correct. But they opted to have 30% list seats for a total of 129, just so they can say that the system is still smaller than it was before Mike Harris purged 27 seats in 1999. Unfortunately, it won’t actually ever be 129 because the OCA is also allowing what are called “overhang seats” — allowing the legislature to grow in size if the winning party wins a disproportionate number of local seats (which can happen, often regularly). More perplexing, the OCA designed its second alternative model, single transferable vote (STV), with 135 seats (they voted 75-to-25 in favour of MMP over STV on April 1). Why not then design the MMP system with 135 seats and no overhangs? So what should the OCA do?
They should design a 135-seat MMP model, just as they designed a 135-seat STV model. Keeping the same 90 local seats they actually adopted means 45 list seats. That gives the optimum two-thirds/one-third (67/33%) split that was recommended by the Law Commission of Canada (and which is, in fact, the smallest ratio of list seats of any MMP system in the world). With 45 list seats, there is enough list MPPs to have list MMPs elected from regional accountable regional open-lists, instead of unaccountable province-wide closed-lists (open lists means voters get to choose who the elected list MMPs are, closed-list means they don’t; if you have a single province-wide list, it is far too big to be open-list, so open-list only works if they are elected regionally). For example, 6 Southern Ontario regions + the North would be ideal with 45 list seats: North i.e. Parry Sound northward (10 local + 3 list MPPs), East i.e. Belleville eastward (11 + 6), Southwest i.e. west of Kitchener-Waterloo, including Bruce Peninsula (13 + 7), Hamilton-Niagara (9 + 5), Central-West i.e. Peel-Halton to Kitchener-Waterloo (14 + 7 ), Central-East i.e. Simcoe-York-Durham-Peterborough (15 + 8), and Toronto (18 + 9). That gives Southern Ontario 42 list seats in 6 regions, an average of 7 list seats per region, which is the optimum number for electing more women and visible minorities (below this size and parties are reluctant to nominate them and if they are too big, women and visible minorities often get lost in a large list, to the benefit of the local “strong man”).
Under this system, all regions retain their current share of the legislature (i.e the North retains 10% of the seats, Toronto retains 20% of the seats, etc). And this would guarantee regional balance within both government and opposition caucuses, instead of drawing up elaborate rules to shoehorn parties into creating balanced lists (which actually lies outside of the OCA’s mandate). Most importantly, it would allow voters to choose their preferred “list” MMPs from among a party’s slate of candidates (these MPPs are, in fact, “regional” MPPs, ensuring all regions are taken into account when forming party- and government-policies; just like local MPPs, they speak on behalf of a specific territory, the only difference here is that they represent the regional scale). This gives far more voter choice and accountability over the system the OCA recommended, and avoids the problem of parties placing party loyalists in prime positions on fixed lists. The OCA counters that parties will naturally want geographic balance and a fair number of women and visible minorities on their party lists. But this is not necessarily the case, particularly, if a party wants to play one region against another (which has been unfortunately all too common in Ontario — i.e. 905 vs. 416, urban vs rural, Toronto vs everyone else). Only with open-list regional MPPs can we ensure that all regions are treated fairly and ensure that more women and visible minorities have the best opportunity to be elected.
There is still time for the Citizens’ Assembly to re-consider some of these design decisions. In fact, the model need not change radically. If it proceeds in its current form, I fear they have not presented Ontarians with a very palatable option. I’m confident that most Ontarians are willing to embrace fair representation (i.e. proportionality — both for parties, women, and visible minorities); but I doubt they are willing to sacrifice accountability to do it (and province-wide closed lists are about as unaccountable as they get). The OCA can make a better model, with relatively small changes to their current model. All it takes is:
1. Get rid of overhangs. It’s an unnecessary complexity.
2. Fix the legislature at 135 seats (90 local, 45 list).
3. This means increasing the list seats slightly from 30% to 33%.
4. Have open, regional lists instead of province-wide closed lists.
5. Calculate proportionality regionally or calculate it province-wide, using highest remainder to apportion party seats to each region (it’s not that complicated, really!).
I strongly encourage the Ontario Citizens’ Assembly to further refine their model and take a good look at the above recommendations.
Sincerely,
Gregory D. Morrow, PhD Candidate
UCLA School of Public Affairs
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