Open Letter to the Ontario Citizens’ Assembly
Monday April 02nd 2007, 6:39 am
Filed under: - Electoral Reform, Canadian Politics

Anyone who has read my past comments on electoral reform knows by now that I favour changing our electoral system, and, in particular, I favour a mixed-member proportional (henceforth MMP) system. Up to now, I have remained silent until the Ontario Citizens’ Assembly (henceforth OCA) completes its MMP model. Now that we know what the OCA’s model looks like — 90 local seats, 39 regional seats, 129 total seats, province-wide closed list, overhangs allowed, I think it is fair to pass judgment. And I do so with the greatest of urgency, because I believe quite strongly that some of the decisions the OCA made in designing its MMP model will have grave consequences on its ability to pass a fall referendum. In fact, in its current form, I highly doubt it will gain the necessary 60% support (it may even have trouble getting 50%). Why is that?

The central problem lies in the OCA’s decision to have the proportional seats assigned from closed province-wide party lists where voters have no say in which list MPP is elected, instead of having open, regional slates of candidates from which voters choose their preferred candidate(s). It’s a critical flaw in the OCA’s MMP model and runs precisely counter to what Ontarians at consultation meetings across the province said — which was that they did not want closed lists.

And yet, the Citizens Assembly could easily recommend regional open lists with relatively small changes to their model. The result would be vastly improved voter choice and vastly improved accountability. And that’s what Ontarians want. The OCA has designed a system with 90 local seats, which I believe this is correct. But they opted to have 30% list seats for a total of 129, just so they can say that the system is still smaller than it was before Mike Harris purged 27 seats in 1999. Unfortunately, it won’t actually ever be 129 because the OCA is also allowing what are called “overhang seats” — allowing the legislature to grow in size if the winning party wins a disproportionate number of local seats (which can happen, often regularly). More perplexing, the OCA designed its second alternative model, single transferable vote (STV), with 135 seats (they voted 75-to-25 in favour of MMP over STV on April 1). Why not then design the MMP system with 135 seats and no overhangs? So what should the OCA do?

They should design a 135-seat MMP model, just as they designed a 135-seat STV model. Keeping the same 90 local seats they actually adopted means 45 list seats. That gives the optimum two-thirds/one-third (67/33%) split that was recommended by the Law Commission of Canada (and which is, in fact, the smallest ratio of list seats of any MMP system in the world). With 45 list seats, there is enough list MPPs to have list MMPs elected from regional accountable regional open-lists, instead of unaccountable province-wide closed-lists (open lists means voters get to choose who the elected list MMPs are, closed-list means they don’t; if you have a single province-wide list, it is far too big to be open-list, so open-list only works if they are elected regionally). For example, 6 Southern Ontario regions + the North would be ideal with 45 list seats: North i.e. Parry Sound northward (10 local + 3 list MPPs), East i.e. Belleville eastward (11 + 6), Southwest i.e. west of Kitchener-Waterloo, including Bruce Peninsula (13 + 7), Hamilton-Niagara (9 + 5), Central-West i.e. Peel-Halton to Kitchener-Waterloo (14 + 7 ), Central-East i.e. Simcoe-York-Durham-Peterborough (15 + 8), and Toronto (18 + 9). That gives Southern Ontario 42 list seats in 6 regions, an average of 7 list seats per region, which is the optimum number for electing more women and visible minorities (below this size and parties are reluctant to nominate them and if they are too big, women and visible minorities often get lost in a large list, to the benefit of the local “strong man”).

Under this system, all regions retain their current share of the legislature (i.e the North retains 10% of the seats, Toronto retains 20% of the seats, etc). And this would guarantee regional balance within both government and opposition caucuses, instead of drawing up elaborate rules to shoehorn parties into creating balanced lists (which actually lies outside of the OCA’s mandate). Most importantly, it would allow voters to choose their preferred “list” MMPs from among a party’s slate of candidates (these MPPs are, in fact, “regional” MPPs, ensuring all regions are taken into account when forming party- and government-policies; just like local MPPs, they speak on behalf of a specific territory, the only difference here is that they represent the regional scale). This gives far more voter choice and accountability over the system the OCA recommended, and avoids the problem of parties placing party loyalists in prime positions on fixed lists. The OCA counters that parties will naturally want geographic balance and a fair number of women and visible minorities on their party lists. But this is not necessarily the case, particularly, if a party wants to play one region against another (which has been unfortunately all too common in Ontario — i.e. 905 vs. 416, urban vs rural, Toronto vs everyone else). Only with open-list regional MPPs can we ensure that all regions are treated fairly and ensure that more women and visible minorities have the best opportunity to be elected.

There is still time for the Citizens’ Assembly to re-consider some of these design decisions. In fact, the model need not change radically. If it proceeds in its current form, I fear they have not presented Ontarians with a very palatable option. I’m confident that most Ontarians are willing to embrace fair representation (i.e. proportionality — both for parties, women, and visible minorities); but I doubt they are willing to sacrifice accountability to do it (and province-wide closed lists are about as unaccountable as they get). The OCA can make a better model, with relatively small changes to their current model. All it takes is:

1. Get rid of overhangs. It’s an unnecessary complexity.
2. Fix the legislature at 135 seats (90 local, 45 list).
3. This means increasing the list seats slightly from 30% to 33%.
4. Have open, regional lists instead of province-wide closed lists.
5. Calculate proportionality regionally or calculate it province-wide, using highest remainder to apportion party seats to each region (it’s not that complicated, really!).

I strongly encourage the Ontario Citizens’ Assembly to further refine their model and take a good look at the above recommendations.

Sincerely,
Gregory D. Morrow, PhD Candidate
UCLA School of Public Affairs


12 Comments/commentaires
Leave a comment/Enregistrer un commentaire

Mr. Morrow makes some valid points that I would agree with like eliminating “overhangs” he is right this is complicated to an “average” citizen that does not study this kind of thing, but he makes closed vs open lists a much larger issue than it really is. This is not a debate that citizens in New Zealand, Scotland or Germany have, this is debated between academics that are a very small part of our democracy, their are positives and negatives to both kinds of lists, keeping the seat total below 130 will be more important to an “average” voter than “open” vs “closed” lists, if anything is going to screw things up for Ontario it will be entertaining changes to satisfy all the spocks with PHD’s who think they know what’s good for the average voter. Let the Citizens put MMP out there the way they need to for the people! after all that’s who will be using it.

Comment/commentaire by Rick Dignard 04.02.07 @ 8:26 pm

I’m curious to know why you think overhangs are an unnecessary complexity. It seems to me that it would be more complex not to allow them. If, for example, five of your party’s constituency candidates win their election, but your party would normally only be allowed four MPPs, and overhangs are not allowed, what happens is that one of your winners must be declared defeated. There are ways to do it (winner with the least margin, for example), but if I was a voter in this riding — or the candidate — I wouldn’t be very happy about it.

Unless there’s a method I’m not thinking about (there might very well be).

Comment/commentaire by Marc Ethier 04.02.07 @ 10:59 pm

Marc — typically, a party would simply keep their “bonus” seats, as is the case in Scotland and Wales. But increasing the list seats from 30 to 33% largely ensures that parties get their fair share. Re-calculating the 2003 results (a pretty high distortion, where the Libs won 70% of seats on 46% of the vote) using a 135-seat, 67/33 model, you get:

LIB: 60 local + 4 list = 64 total (47%)
PC: 24 local + 23 list = 47 total (35%)
NDP: 6 local + 14 list = 20 total (15%)
GRN: 0 local + 4 list = 4 total (3%)

Comment/commentaire by democraticspace 04.03.07 @ 3:55 am

I’d have prefered fewer and paralell seats. This system will still cause minority governments.

Comment/commentaire by Nick J Boragina 04.03.07 @ 3:34 pm

Greg,

I fully agree with the points raised here. I think that another major problem with the OCA proposal is the issue that closed lists prevent independent/non-affiliated candidates from holding seats in a third of legislature. Freedom of association also entails freedom not to associate, and limiting the access of independents to a section of the legislature is most likely unconstitutional on these grounds.

I will be writing the OCA urging them to reconsider the particular model of MMP they have selectd as well.

Comment/commentaire by Devin 04.04.07 @ 7:05 am

The average variance between seats and votes in the last four Ontario elections was 18.4% – that means the winning party’s share of Legislature seats was 18.4 points higher than its share of the vote.

The CA’s current proposal for MMP and its inclusion of overhang seats would create a very close match between seats and votes. As Greg notes, however, the price would be considerable as 30% of the elected members would reach the House through compensatory seats and would owe their election to their party’s decision to rank them high on its compensatory list.

Rank and file members do have substantial control over the nomination process in single member constituencies now, and they can still have significant influence on the choice and positioning of candidates if the compensatory seats are allocated by region rather than across the province.

I’ve run the figures for an MMP system very similar to that proposed by Greg, using five electoral regions with fairly clear common lines of interest in southern Ontario; a smaller electoral region in northern Ontario; and no overhang seats. If no votes shifted through the use of a dual/vote system as proposed by the CA, the last two Ontario elections would have yielded a Conservative minority under mMP in 1999 and produced a more subdued Liberal majority in 2003 than under the FPTP system actually used.

For just two elections, the variance under this regionally-based MMP system would have been 8.4% compared to the actual result of over 18% – a very marked difference. I’ll post the number if I get to them, I believe a longer-term set of simulations would show an average variance down around 6%. This is within range of many PR electoral systems now in use around the world. It would no longer be possible for an Ontario party to win a massive majority of Legislature seats with voting support in the low 40% range and continuation of three or more viable parties in the House. And the system would have the advantage that the MPPs elected from the compensatory lists would have a regional mandate and a direct link to party members in their region, not just be the choice of central party brass.

Comment/commentaire by Mike C 04.04.07 @ 7:59 am

If you want to lobby your MPP you can always go to the Ontario Members of Provincial Parliament contact list.

Comment/commentaire by James 04.04.07 @ 8:57 am

I would agree with most of your analysis and recommendation, particularly with the 135 seat model and eliminating overhangs.

I am still uncomfortable with any kind of list system which is party determined, and I would prefer that the regional or top-up seats be filled by the non-winning party candidates with the highest popular vote in the region. They can legitimately claim that people voted for them, and it puts more voters votes into the legislature.

Thanks,
Jim

Comment/commentaire by Jim Johnston 04.04.07 @ 9:02 am

Will the Citizens, at the very last moment, change this many components of their model?

If not, perhaps they would simply look at open regional lists in five large regions, changing nothing else.

East (Durham and east) 26 (18+8)
Toronto + York 35 (24 + 11)
Peel-Halton-Hamilton-Niagara-Brant 28 (20+8)
Southwest 28 (20+8)
North (incl. Muskoka) 12 (8+4 or 9+3)

On a recalculation of the 2003 vote, the only overhang is one extra seat in Toronto.

As reassurance, maybe they might cap overhangs at two per region, total 10, maximum 139. This would ensure regional balance is not seriously upset, while maintaining very good proportionality.

But if they keep their present model, I still expect it will get well over 60% support.

Comment/commentaire by Wilf Day 04.04.07 @ 1:12 pm

Wilf,

“But if they keep their present model, I still expect it will get well over 60% support.”

I have great respect for your knowledge of and passion for electoral reform. But sometimes when one thinks something is so right (obvious, even), one forgets to question their assumptions. And it’s under those circumstances that we are left wondering what went wrong because we were so sure of ourselves.

I think you are suffering from this a bit here. You want MMP to succeed so much and you believe that the general desire for fairness, for more women/minorities, will be enough to compel 60% of the population to endorse change. I think that’s wishful thinking.

Already, you are seeing high-ranking Liberals (Greg Sorbara) and Tories (John Tory) attacking the OCA recommendation.

The OCA would be wise to eliminate as many negatives as possible. I would argue that the only “negative” they should tolerate is an enlarged legislature. But even here, you need to fight the simple rhetoric with simple rhetoric. People don’t want more politicians, understandably. But all the OCA is recommending is undoing what Mike Harris did and restoring the legislature to pre-1999 size (and that should be the tag line — and to be precise, doing so means restoring the 27 lost seats, which actually gives a legislature that is 134 seats).

If a bigger legislature was the only negative and the argument for doing so is crystal clear — undoing one of the bad decisions of the Harris era, then you might have a chance of success.

But unfortunately the model as designed by the OCA needlessly opens them up a host of other criticisms. The chief among them is that voters don’t get to choose which “list” members get elected, giving people the impression that the system helps parties more than people.

But it need not be the case and is simple to fix. You may be right that the OCA won’t change as many things as I’ve suggested at this point (although I know there was some support for the 33% list seats, and it boggles the mind why the OCA thinks it is OK for their STV model to have 135 seats but the MMP model should only have 129).

-Greg

Comment/commentaire by democraticspace 04.04.07 @ 2:41 pm

As a strong supporter of First Past The Post I sincerely hope you MMP backers let the entire voting public in on your debates like this. That way it will ensure ordinary voters are scared sideways by “overhangs” “distortions” “average variance” and other critical issues so much that they say no thanks to MMP.

Comment/commentaire by Bill Tieleman 04.04.07 @ 10:19 pm

What’s Black and Blue and Floats in the Gulf of St. Lawrence?…

Answer: a mainlander who’s told one too many Newfie jokes. A note to federal Conservative party supporters: when your party leader and a provincial premier are engaging in a war of words for the hearts and minds of the voters……

Trackback by Bow. James Bow. 04.10.07 @ 6:35 pm



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