How MMP Lists Are Created
Scott Tribe, who runs Progressive Bloggers, asked me how I thought the party lists should be created under the MMP system recommended by the Ontario Citizens Assembly. He has posted my response on his blog. I thought I would just copy that response here in its entirety (note that the # of regional list nominees below are minimums, parties will probably want to nominate a couple extras per region):
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A critical component to the proposed MMP electoral reform system for Ontario are the List MPP’s. There has been much gnashing of teeth over whether these are “democratically accountable” MPP’s or not. I will not re-visit that argument today, but what I will be touching on today is what might be the best method (from a democratic viewpoint) that parties should endeavour to use when picking people for their various lists, because that was not set in stone by the Citizens Assembly. It was left to the parties to come up with their own method, with the provision being they had to submit their lists to Elections Ontario to a) show who they picked and what order they’re in and I believe b) how they picked them.
I again talked with Greg Morrow of DemocraticSPACE.com. I chatted with him a couple of days ago about this, and he discussed with me what his preferred method would be. He has a very detailed explanation that he goes into below, so without any further ado….
Greg believed there are many good options out there to choose from, The best way, in his opinion, is to hold REGIONAL NOMINATION MEETINGS. The key is for those regions to be big enough that enough women and minorities are nominated (according to Greg, a minimum of 5 list spots would be a good number), but small enough that the candidates/regions represent a genuine community of interest.
In Greg’s setup, Party members at regional nomination meetings can decide whether they want to include candidates nominated locally on their list or not (in some cases, where it is clear a candidate will win locally, it is a waste to dual-list him/her; in other cases, it might be desirable to dual-list a candidate who faces a tough local battle; the party could set some basic parameters — for example, at least 1-2 list candidates per region must be not dual-listed, to ensure there are enough list members in case all local members are elected, or 40% of list candidates must be women, or that there be a representative number of minority candidates — i.e. roughly equal to their share of the regional population, etc).
In Greg’s opinion, allowing locally-nominated candidates to be eligible for list spots is important to generate competition within the parties (as people say: bad for politicians, good for voters), which increases the accountability of local MPPs. But, if the list is entirely made up of local candidates, you close off opportunities for women, minorities, or just candidates who bring some special skills to the table, but who are don’t have the money to run a local campaign. According to Greg, the key is to put the selection of list candidates in the hands of the regions, rather than the central party executive. If so, it’s not dissimilar from local nominations today.
However, Greg believes this process also gives the party some flexibility in deciding how order its list candidates — the regions nominate the list candidates, but the party can then decide whether to “zipper” its list — i.e. alternate man-woman-man-woman-etc, or whether to put candidates from regions where it thinks it will not be as successful locally (so as the ensure a caucus that is regionally balanced), or to ensure that enough of its top spots are minorities. It’s the best of both worlds — candidates are nominated regionally (thus accountable to the membership in a given region) but the party can be strategic in how it orders those nominated candidates.
Greg says there are different ways that you can think of the regions — you can have fewer larger regions or more smaller regions. It’s a trade-off — the smaller the regions, the better they represent regional interests, but the worse it is for women and minorities (since there aren’t enough list spots — the literature generally recognizes you need at least 5 list spots in order for women/minorities to get a fair shot). On the other hand, fewer regions means that they can all have at least 5 list spots.
Greg then sent me some very detailed options of how you could do the regional list nominations - he included 3 possible examples:
A) 6 larger regions — best for women/minorities (since all regions have 5+ list spots)
B) 9 medium-sized regions — a balance of list spots and geography
C) 11 smaller regions — better regional representation, but at expense of women/minorities (since small # of list spots)
Below is what each example might look like in Greg’s scenario:
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Option A: 6 larger regions
1. NORTHERN ONTARIO
(Kenora, Rainy River, Thunder Bay, Cochrane, Algoma, Manitoulin, Sudbury, Greater Sudbury, Timiskaming, Nipissing, Parry Sound, Muskoka)
estimated 9 local ridings
nominate 4 list candidates
2. EASTERN ONTARIO
(Prince Edwards, Hastings, Lennox & Addington, Frontenac, Renfrew, Lanark, Leeds-Grenville, Stormont-Dundas-Glengarry, Prescott-Russell, Ottawa)
estimated 13 local ridings
nominate 6 list candidates
3. CENTRAL ONTARIO
(Simcoe, York, Durham, Haliburton, Kawartha Lakes, Peterborough, Northumberland)
estimated 16 local ridings
nominate 7 list candidates
4. SOUTHWESTERN ONTARIO
(Essex, Chatham-Kent, Lambton, Elgin, Middlesex, Oxford, Perth, Wellington, Waterloo, Huron, Bruce, Grey, Dufferin)
estimated 16 local ridings
nominate 7 list candidates
5. HORSESHOE
(Hamilton, Haldimand, Norfolk, Brant, Niagara, Peel, Halton)
estimated 18 local ridings
nominate 8 list candidates
6. TORONTO
(Toronto)
estimated 18 local ridings
nominate 8 list candidates
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Option B: 9 medium-sized regions
1. NORTHERN ONTARIO
(Kenora, Rainy River, Thunder Bay, Cochrane, Algoma, Manitoulin, Sudbury, Greater Sudbury, Timiskaming, Nipissing, Parry Sound, Muskoka)
estimated 9 local ridings
nominate 4 list candidates
2. OTTAWA-EAST
(Renfrew, Lanark, Stormont-Dundas-Glengarry, Prescott-Russell, Ottawa)
estimated 8 local ridings
nominate 4 list candidates
3. QUINTE-LIMESTONE-KAWARTHA
(Prince Edwards, Hastings, Lennox & Addington, Frontenac, Leeds-Grenville, Northumberland, Peterborough, Kawartha Lakes)
estimated 6 local ridings
nominate 3 list candidates
4. SIMCOE-UPPER GRAND-HURON
(Perth, Wellington, Waterloo, Huron, Bruce, Grey, Dufferin, Simcoe)
estimated 10 local ridings
nominate 5 list candidates
5. SOUTHWESTERN ONTARIO
(Essex, Chatham-Kent, Lambton, Elgin, Middlesex, Oxford)
estimated 9 local ridings
nominate 4 list candidates
6. HAMILTON-NIAGARA
(Hamilton, Haldimand, Norfolk, Brant, Niagara)
estimated 8-9 local ridings
nominate 4 list candidates
7. YORK-DURHAM
(York, Durham)
estimated 9 local ridings
nominate 4 list candidates
8. PEEL-HALTON
(Peel, Halton)
estimated 10 local ridings
nominate 5 list candidates
9. TORONTO
(Toronto)
estimated 18 local ridings
nominate 8 list candidates
***
Option C: 11 smaller regions
1. NORTHWEST ONTARIO
(Kenora, Rainy River, Thunder Bay)
estimated 2-3 local ridings
nominate 1-2 list candidates
2. NORTHEAST ONTARIO
(Cochrane, Algoma, Manitoulin, Sudbury, Greater Sudbury, Timiskaming, Nipissing, Parry Sound, Muskoka)
estimated 6-7 local ridings
nominate 2-3 list candidates
3. OTTAWA
(Ottawa)
estimated 6 local ridings
nominate 3 list candidates
4. EASTERN ONTARIO
(Prince Edwards, Hastings, Lennox & Addington, Frontenac, Renfrew, Lanark, Leeds-Grenville, Stormont-Dundas-Glengarry, Prescott-Russell)
estimated 7 local ridings
nominate 3 list candidates
5. CENTRAL ONTARIO
(Simcoe, Haliburton, Kawartha Lakes, Peterborough, Northumberland)
estimated 7 local ridings
nominate 3 list candidates
6. HAMILTON-NIAGARA
(Hamilton, Haldimand, Norfolk, Brant, Niagara)
estimated 8-9 local ridings
nominate 4 list candidates
7. UPPER GRAND
(Wellington, Waterloo, Dufferin)
estimated 6 local ridings
nominate 3 list candidates
8. SOUTHWESTERN ONTARIO
(Essex, Chatham-Kent, Lambton, Elgin, Middlesex, Oxford, Perth, Huron, Bruce, Grey)
estimated 10-11 local ridings
nominate 5 list candidates
9. YORK-DURHAM
(York, Durham)
estimated 9 local ridings
nominate 4 list candidates
10. PEEL-HALTON
(Peel, Halton)
estimated 10 local ridings
nominate 5 list candidates
11. TORONTO
(Toronto)
estimated 18 local ridings
nominate 8 list candidates
——
There’s a lot there, but its important to show that there are models out there that can be used to ensure the candidates for the lists are picked in a democratic manner similar to what we have now in our different parties nomination meetings. One other thing Greg mentioned is this: The Labour Party in New Zealand (which Greg would argue is the Liberal Party equivalent) creates its list in exactly the manner as he described above — list candidates are nominated democratically at regional conventions and the party then orders the nominees in order to meet its goals (for example, to compensate for weakness locally in certain areas, they put candidates from areas where they are traditionally weak near the top of their list). But this is done fairly — balancing men, women, and minorities (Maori) and across all regions.
As Greg says and as I’ve said before as well, there is no need to reinvent the wheel here. Being able to demonstrate exactly how it works in the same MMP system that we’re considering is the best bet of getting buy-in from the voters of Ontario. I also think that if this system was pushed for by the Party grassroots, the ongoing fear of the central executive manipulating these lists would be relieved by the implementation of this system.
Some will argue there’s no guarantee the various parties will pick this. Well, its up to the various party activists and grassroots to push for this in their respective parties. I again will argue that if a party is seen by voters to be manipulating the lists as opposed to others who are using the above or similar methods to pick their list, the offending party will almost certainly get hammered on the hustings over it, and will probably pay a pretty heavy electoral price. Between that, and with other examples out there of democratic ways to pick these list MPP’s, I think the pressure to do so here as well would be pretty intense. I dont think the various parties would have any choice but to do so. The Party Executives may try to argue that they need to retain power of appointment in certain ridings (as they do already), but again, a determined Party membership will either limit that power or prevent it from happenning.
This “fear” is the least of the arguments against MMP, in my view.
Update:
As Wilf suggested below a variation on Option C would be to put Perth, Huron, Bruce, Grey with Waterloo, Wellington and Dufferin. Let’s call this Option D.
Option D: 11 smaller regions
1. NORTHWEST ONTARIO
(Kenora, Rainy River, Thunder Bay)
estimated 2-3 local ridings
nominate 1-2 list candidates
2. NORTHEAST ONTARIO
(Cochrane, Algoma, Manitoulin, Sudbury, Greater Sudbury, Timiskaming, Nipissing, Parry Sound, Muskoka)
estimated 6-7 local ridings
nominate 2-3 list candidates
3. OTTAWA
(Ottawa)
estimated 6 local ridings
nominate 3 list candidates
4. EASTERN ONTARIO
(Prince Edwards, Hastings, Lennox & Addington, Frontenac, Renfrew, Lanark, Leeds-Grenville, Stormont-Dundas-Glengarry, Prescott-Russell)
estimated 7 local ridings
nominate 3 list candidates
5. CENTRAL EAST
(Simcoe, Haliburton, Kawartha Lakes, Peterborough, Northumberland)
estimated 7 local ridings
nominate 3 list candidates
6. CENTRAL WEST
(Wellington, Waterloo, Dufferin, Perth, Huron, Bruce, Grey)
estimated 8-9 local ridings
nominate 4 list candidates
7. SOUTHWESTERN ONTARIO
(Essex, Chatham-Kent, Lambton, Elgin, Middlesex, Oxford)
estimated 9 local ridings
nominate 4 list candidates
8. HAMILTON-NIAGARA
(Hamilton, Haldimand, Norfolk, Brant, Niagara)
estimated 8-9 local ridings
nominate 4 list candidates
9. YORK-DURHAM
(York, Durham)
estimated 9 local ridings
nominate 4 list candidates
10. PEEL-HALTON
(Peel, Halton)
estimated 10 local ridings
nominate 5 list candidates
11. TORONTO
(Toronto)
estimated 18 local ridings
nominate 8 list candidates
Religious School Funding in Ontario, Redux
If we were starting from scratch today, I don’t think there would be a lot of support for creating two separate public school systems. But let’s be clear: even if we had one single secular public “system”, it would still operate in the same way as the 4-pronged “system” (public/separate/English/French) we have today — as a series of relatively autonomous boards that respond to the particulars of their communities within a basic policy framework set out by the Ministry of Education.
The two proposed alternatives — either a) rescinding public funding for Catholic school boards (as proposed by the Green Party) or b) extending public funding to private religious schools (as proposed by the PC Party) — have nothing to do with improving the quality of education in Ontario. They are essentially symbolic administrative moves that weaken education, not strengthen it.
Let’s take the first alternative. Subsidizing private schools is bad public policy, whether they are religious or not. Funding religious schools provides an incentive for parents to take their kids out of the public schools, because the private schools have the double benefit of getting public funding *and* still collecting private tuition (at $400 million in public funds as proposed by Tory for 53,000 kids works out to $7,500 per child, on par with public funding, in some cases exceeding it — add private tuition funds on top and it’s clear that these private schools have a huge financial advantage over public schools). It’s a classic result — private schools can then use their financial advantage to attract the best teachers, buy better equipment etc — the result is that public schools suffer. Welcome to the U.S. education system. Moreover, why would we want to segregate kids of different faiths into different schools? I would think it’s better for kids to learn about and respect the difference traditions of all faiths and cultures. Frankly, I find it surprising that some Liberals support taking money out of the public schools to subsidize private schools and encourage the segregation of Ontario society along religious lines. So to me, John Tory’s “solution” is flat out bad public policy.
The other alternative — withdrawing public funding from Catholic school boards — is more credible, but it has serious negatives that make it undesirable. We can argue this approach on two grounds: 1) if you think Catholic schools are teaching religious education, you could argue that it’s unfair that they receive funding while other religious schools do not, or 2) if you think they are Catholic in name only, then you could argue that it is wasteful to have a duplicate public system.
I think that separate school boards, as they exist today, are not substantially dissimilar from public school boards — that 95% of them are Catholic in name only. Others might disagree. They are subjected to the same teacher credentials, standardized testing and curriculum requirements that public school boards face. And importantly, they aren’t private (they don’t collect private tuition). And if there are cases where some students are prejudiced on religious grounds, because they are publicly funded, we have the ability to rescind funding on a case-by-case basis if some schools are not living up to their obligations. If Catholic schools don’t follow the rules, they will lose their funding. It’s that simple. So, to me, the argument against Catholic boards — as they operate today — is largely a symbolic one. Given that Catholic school boards, in general, out-perform public school boards, it seems particularly odd to argue we must get rid of them. Clearly, it is symbolism and politics, not the welfare of kids that drives this urge. And I just cannot accept an outcome that yields worse results (i.e. closing down the best-performing schools).
But if the Catholic and public schools are parallel public systems, wouldn’t it be more efficient to simply merge them? Well, the same argument was made by Mike Harris to amalgamate municipalities i.e. less administrative costs = more efficient. But, unfortunately, those cost savings haven’t materialized because quite simply, scale matters. You can’t simply double the size of an administrative unit and not increase the number of administrative staff. In many cases, these new amalgamated municipalities are simply too large to govern effectively. School boards are no different.
So, how would we merge the public and Catholic systems? There are really only two ways to do it. The first is to keep the public school board districts as they are (geographically) and simply add the Catholic board kids — this effectively doubles the number of kids in the board. I, for one, don’t think that bigger is better in education. Quite the contrary, in fact (especially since we’re working hard to reduce class sizes and gives kids more individual attention). So there’s no free lunch — you double the board, you have to double the administration, double the teachers, etc. So instead of two smaller boards, you have one giant one, which will inevitably be less accountable to parents than smaller ones (because suddenly there are twice as many people to whom that board is responsible). It’s the equivalent of doubling the population of your local riding and expecting your MPP to be as responsive. I don’t think most people would see this as a positive.
The second, and perhaps more feasible option, is to re-district the entire province into new school boards so that the average size (in population) of the school boards remains the same as it is today. But to do that means having smaller geographic areas. So you end up with boards that have the same number of kids as today, but are smaller geographically. Nothing wrong with that, in theory.
The problem with this is that the way the system works, teachers, staff, materials, etc are all hired, bought and administered at the school board level. Pensions and seniority are all tied to the school boards. To re-district the entire province would mean moving teachers and staff from one board to another, splitting up books and other resources, figuring out who falls where in seniority, and somehow moving pensions to different boards that often have different standards, etc. It would be a mess. And again, we have to ask ourselves, does all of this administrative juggling improve education in Ontario? No, it doesn’t. It has nothing to do with improving the quality of education; it’s a symbolic and political game.
So what to do? I think we let school board trustees and parents decide what they want to do. We are already seeing a merger of public and Catholic school boards in some cases, where they independently lack resources. This process is happening voluntarily by school boards and parents, etc where merging the two boards provides a clear advantage for students. This makes sense. These mergers also illustrate that there is no ideological divide between Catholic and public schools — that is, it affirms the claim that Catholic schools are pretty much just like pubic schools these days. If it makes sense to merge, then let’s let them decide for themselves. Otherwise, let’s see things for what they really are — just a series of school boards (some that we call “public” and others that we call “Separate” or “Catholic” because that’s what they started out as) that all do the same thing. Massive administrative juggling isn’t going to change that. And it certainly isn’t about improving the quality of education in Ontario, which is, after all, what it’s all about.
Who Art Thou, Liberals?
Who are Liberals? We know who NDPers are — they have a clear set of values rooted in democratic socialism. Conservatives, too, are (edit: sometimes) grounded in principles of individualism, family (in the traditional sense), and often faith. But Liberals (both provincially in Ontario and federally) are much harder to understand. They run the gamut from very progressive to distinctly conservative. This “big tent” has earned Liberals, fairly or not, a pejorative branding from both the left and right as united not by principle, but by power (specifically, the lust for it, and the willingness to go along with anything that gets the most votes). And there is a certain degree of truth to this. I’ve seen this firsthand, having met a number of Liberals who I am quite certain would sell out their own mothers if they thought it would help them climb the political ladder. But I’ve also met many Liberals, particularly those who are new converts to the party (resulting from a competitive federal leadership race), who do stand on clear principles — namely social justice, equal opportunity, and a balance between empowering the talents of individuals and protecting collective interests.
Free of the shackles of a decade or more of internal battles (personified most clearly as the fued between Jean Chretien and Paul Martin) — many Liberals appear to have actually done some genuine soul-searching over the past 20 months. A new breed of younger Liberals has emerged that is more idealistic and more progressive than its previous incarnation.
But the question remains — is this new progressive Liberalism genuine, or is it merely a strategy (or merely rhetoric) to win the most votes? After all, following 13 years of relatively easy rule against a divided right, it is now the Canadian left that finds itself divided across Liberal, NDP, Green, and Bloc factions (all of which promote leftist policies to greater or lesser extents). The federal Liberals under Stephane Dion, and provincial Liberals in Ontario under Dalton McGuinty, have sought to unite a centre-left coalition around progressive ideals. It’s a good political strategy, given that about 65-70% of Canadians (and Ontarians) are generally progressive. But it is genuine? Or is it just rhetoric? Will Liberals follow-through on this new-found progressivism if elected? What will Liberals actually do, if given the chance?
The current debate surrounding electoral reform in Ontario is a test of Liberals’ progressivism. On principles alone, if they are the progressives they claim to be, Liberals should undoubtedly be in favour of it. For those Liberals who actually believe the progressive values they are now selling, the choice is clear — a mixed-member proportional voting system is more fair, increases voter choice, improves local accountability, and opens up greater opportunities for women and minorities who have been severely under-represented under the current winner-takes-all system. But for those Liberals who see progressivism as merely a strategy to unite the left and achieve more power for themselves and their allies, the choice is much less clear. They ask, will mixed-member proportional hurt our chances of getting a majority government? (as though ruling unopposed — i.e. “winning” the war — was the only prize worth fighting for, as opposed to actually achieving progressive policies and tangible results)
There have been some signs that Liberals genuinely believe their claimed values. Dalton McGuinty campaigned in 2003 on pursuing electoral reform and followed through (albeit rather late in the game) by creating the Citizens Assembly to carry out that task. Many of his senior cabinet ministers support electoral reform generally and the MMP system recommended by the Citizens Assembly specifically — Deputy Premier and Health Minister George Smitherman, Attorney General Michael Bryant, Municipal Affairs Minister John Gerretsen, for example. And a number of the new young Liberals strongly support MMP.
But there are signs that, once again, some Liberals are willing to sacrifice their values to maximize their quest for power. Opponents within McGuinty’s clan lobbied for and received a super majority threshold (60% support) for the October 10th referendum, making its passage less likely (and skewing the basic tenet of democracy that all votes are equal by making a vote against MMP worth 1.5 times the value of a vote in favour of MMP) — this despite receiving 100% of the power with only 46% support. Some prominent Liberals don’t support the recommendations of the Citizens Assembly — Finance Minister Greg Sorbara chief among them. And other young Liberals, who’ve spent their short lives to date climbing the political ladder — puckering up to those who might one day give them access to power — have also come out against MMP, thereby sacrificing the values to which they purportedly adhere. These Liberals are a part of the “old boys club” (or in the case of the latter, desperately want to be soon accepted into the club). They fear that a legislature that actually reflects the will of the people (as opposed to shutting out minority voices, minority in all sense of the word) will make it harder for them to rule unopposed, as though actually considering the views of all Ontarians is a bad thing. In short, they believe proportional representation will dilute their power. But even here, they are wrong. In fact, MMP would eliminate the inherent PC seat advantage that exists in Ontario (at 37% support each, the PCs get 52 seats to the Liberals 44) — with MMP, you get what the people think you deserve, no more, no less.
Every now and then, a pivotal moment comes along that asks people to look deep inside themselves. The choice of whether to support MMP or not represents such a pivotal moment for Liberals. The Ontario Liberal Party’s origins lie in standing up against the conservative patrician rule of the Family Compact. Liberals stood up for the people against the elites. While the Tories pandered exclusively to the Protestant majority, the Liberals united Catholics and Protestants, urban and rural. Liberals were inclusive and fought for fairness. Will Liberals today have the courage that their predecessors had and once again stand up for inclusiveness and fairness? Will Liberals stand up and support the recommendations of the people (the Citizens Assembly they created)? We know most NDPers and Greens will support it. And we know that most PCers will not. So electoral reform will live or die at Liberal hands. I pray that today’s Liberals are as courageous as their forebearers of yesterday.
