Most people know that New York Times columnist (and Princeton economist) Paul Krugman has deep ties to the Clintons, all the way back to 1992 when Bill recruited him to counter Bush I’s economic policies. So it’s no surprise he’s been writing pro-Hillary, anti-Obama pieces throughout the campaign. His latest piece “Self-Inflicted Confusion” is more of the same. The central argument here is that “[Obama] still can’t seem to win over large blocs of Democratic voters, especially among the white working class. As a result, he keeps losing big states.”

Perhaps Krugman simply chose his words poorly but the above statement implies that the white working class constitutes a large bloc of Democratic voters. By “white working class” I presume Krugman means precisely the white, heavily religious, rural, gun-owning, blue-collar voters that Hillary has won. But do these really constitute a “large bloc of Democratic voters”, as Krugman suggests? Not really. The majority of this voting bloc votes Republican, as 2004 Pennsylvania exit polls clearly show.

In 2004, of those who said religion was their top issue, Bush won 92% to 8%. Bush won rural voters 73% to 27%. And Bush won gun-owners over John Kerry 62% to 38%. The point is, while the Clinton campaign has used this voting bloc to point to Obama’s weaknesses, it isn’t a voting bloc that Democrats typically win, regardless of the candidate. They are solidly Republican.

Looking at the big picture, the fact is, both candidates have their stronger and weaker demographics. Hillary does well with older, rural, Latinos, and card-carrying Democrats. But we could just as easily question why Hillary can’t win youth, urban, African-Americans and independents, which are Obama’s strong demographics.

We should not be too surprised that Hillary won Pennsylvania since it was a closed primary (independents — Obama’s stronger demographic — could not vote) and where Hillary had the backing of the Democratic machine (governor, mayors, etc). That Obama cut a 25-point deficit a few weeks ahead of the vote down to 9.3% shows he’s making in-roads with her demographic. Recall that Obama won independents by 37 points in Missouri, 30 points in California, and even 15 points in Clinton’s home state of New York. Had 15% of the electorate been independent (as it’s typically been in open Democratic primaries) and Obama won them by 65-35, the result would have been very close — 51.7-48.3 — just a 3.4% margin. And that’s despite the fact that a whopping 32% of the voters were over 60 (Hillary’s strong demographic).

That Obama is making in-roads is clear when you compare the 2008 exit polls for Ohio and Pennsylvania. For example, Obama won 26% of the senior (65+) vote in Ohio, but improved to 37% in PA. He also won 26% of the rural vote in Ohio, and again improved to 37% in PA. Of course, there were more seniors (22% in PA vs. 14% in OH) and rural folks (20% in PA vs 10% in OH), so Hillary could put up big raw numbers in those demographics to offset her lower margins. Obama even improved among lower income voters — he actually won <$15k households (which he lost in OH) and improved from 36% to 45% among $15-30k households. He also improved his share of the white vote by a few points. And so on. So he’s making progress with his weaker groups. By contrast, Clinton isn’t making in-roads with her weaker groups. For example, she won 35% of the youth vote (18-29) in Ohio and 35% again in Pennsylvania. And she won 13% of the African-American vote in Ohio and just 10% in PA.

But the central question here is why does the media define “electability” based on winning the poor, white, rural, gun-owning worker, as opposed to the urban- or suburban voter? (Krugman’s entire argument rests on Obama not winning as many white working-class voters as Clinton) I would suggest it’s because we cling to the myth — propagated largely by Republicans, ironically — that less-educated, rural, salt-of-the-earth blue-collar Americans present the “real” America while educated, urban, more liberal white-collar workers do not. It goes back to John Locke — the idea that the guy who “works the land” has a higher claim on it than others. To me, if Democrats are going to improve the disparities between the haves and the have nots, fix the messes in education and health care, and adopt a more sensible foreign policy, they need to make their case on its own merits, not simply accept how Republicans have framed the debate (and then proceed to demonstrate how they, too, can pander to the Republican base).

The reality is, America today is largely an urban, service-based economy, not a rural, resource-based one. Americans are primarily suburban (50%) and urban (30%) — 80% in urban areas — and only 20% rural. The battleground in November is the suburbs (also where the highest % of independents live), not the sparsely-populated rural areas, which are solidly Republican, nor the cites, which are solidly Democrat (even in red states). The key to Democratic victory is winning over suburban independents and mobilizing huge turnout in solidly Democratic cities, not trying to convert gun-toting rural Republicans to suddenly vote Democrat (it ain’t gonna happen!).

Now it’s pretty clear that Hillary cannot catch Obama in delegates. Hillary picked up only 10 extra in PA, so Obama dropped from 166 to 156. He’s on pace to win 55-60% to 40-45% in North Carolina, which would net him between 15-25 extra delegates, so even if Hillary narrowly wins Indiana (he currently leads by a point or two), she’ll be worse off on May 7 than she was before PA. That’s why Axelrod says the basic dynamics of the race haven’t changed. It’s hardly accurate for Krugman to say that because his campaign manager said this that his campaign isn’t still transformational (indeed, Obama’s largest rally yet drew 35,000 in Philadelphia last week). So whether you argue it on the “math” or whether you look at the progress he’s making with her demographic groups, it’s clear to any objective observer that Obama will be the Democratic nominee. Unless…

But let’s say she makes an argument to the 300 or so undecided superdelegates so they overturn the results from 30+ million voters. Given that the Democrats need to win over independents — a demographic in which Hillary doesn’t do well, especially against McCain, who is popular among independents — and a large turnout in the (heavily African-American) cities, it should be clear that if Hillary wins by swaying the party establishment, she’s going to have a hard time winning the election. She won’t get the independents and she’ll have a hard time mobilizing the (heavily African-American) cities, who will feel dis-enfrachised that Obama isn’t the nominee, despite winning the primaries and caucuses.

Mark my words. If Hillary is the nominee, the Democrats lose. There’s no guarantee that Obama will win, but he sure gives the Democrats the best chance.

In a follow-up to my earlier post, TTC workers have rejected the deal their union leadership had accepted from TTC management. Going against its previous claims to provide a 48-hour strike notice, the TTC union shut down the system Friday at midnight without any notice, stranding thousands. Despite improved health benefits, a 3% per year pay raise, and a clause that ensures TTC drivers are the best-paid throughout the GTA (meaning if Mississauga workers get a raise, TTC drivers will get another raise), 65% of TTC workers voted against the deal.

Shutting down the TTC without any warning is simply irresponsible. Moreover, it is dangerous to strand people at midnight with few other options to get home at that hour. The TTC unions just squandered any goodwill Torontonians had left. There’s little doubt that they will be ordered back to work. If the legislature sits tomorrow, the TTC could be back up for Monday. And from Adam Giambrone’s (TTC chair) comments, TTC workers shouldn’t expect to see any more money on the table.

On occasion of it being Earth Day, I thought a post on urban planning was in order, specifically regarding policies in Los Angeles (one of the least sustainable cities I know). I’ve never understood why L.A. can’t accommodate both the car and build mass transit. It isn’t either/or, as most Angelinos like to believe. Some people want to drive, others prefer to take transit (providing it is reliable, safe, and clean). Why limit choice by forcing people to drive?

But here’s what most people in L.A. don’t understand: current L.A. parking regulations don’t reflect reality, even in L.A. New market condos require 2.25 parking spaces per unit (or, in some cases, 2.5 spaces or even 2.75 spaces in special districts), regardless of the size of the unit. That literally means that they expect every single household to have 2 cars and every other household to have someone over for dinner every other night (0.25 guest spaces). Since this doesn’t reflect reality, what we get are fewer housing units and a lot of expensive empty parking spaces in new buildings.

In most cases, parking requirements in L.A. — not density — is what limits how many units of housing can be built. You simply cannot park the required number of cars on the site, so you build fewer units than is allowed. In many cases, you can only build about 75% of the number of units allowed by zoning. We are literally choosing to house cars over people, because the more cars you house, the less housing units you get. What’s worse: because it costs so much money and space to build the required parking (and because they can’t get the number of units allowed on the site), developers are forced to build bigger units, which means there are few small (and thus more affordable) market-rate units available. That L.A. hasn’t met its housing demand in over a decade is one symptom of the problem (even now, with prices falling due to the mortgage meltdown, there still is more demand than supply).

But here’s the rub: if you look at the number of cars vs. the number of housing units in L.A., you find that on average, there are about 1.4 cars per unit (which is to say that about half of households have 1 car and half have 2 cars, and a few even have none!). Adding 0.25 guest spaces per unit and the actual number of spaces required per unit in L.A. is 1.65. Now, let’s be clear: 1.65 spaces per unit is a very high number. In New York City, by comparison, there are 1.7 million registered vehicles for 3.4 million housing units — a ratio of 0.50 per unit — 3.3 times fewer than the 1.65 required in L.A. So, indeed, L.A. is a driving city. But we need only 1.65, not 2.25.

Think about it, we could reduce the parking standard by over 25% — from 2.25 to 1.65 parking spaces per unit and still accommodate all the cars required in L.A.; this would allow us to build over 25% more housing units without even changing the density (since in many cases, as I said above, you can only build about 75% of the allowable units).

Now imagine if we required all projects throughout the city (over a certain size, let’s say 10+ units) to set aside 10% of the units as affordable. It’s a win-win for everyone. We accommodate cars at the ratio required for L.A. (1.65 spaces per unit), developers get over 15% more market units and we institute a mechanism to generate 10% affordable units for every new project in the city. All it takes is leadership.

If an election was held today in Canada, the Conservatives would win a weak minority, according to the latest DemocraticSPACE seat projections (which are based on a weighted average of recent polling data; note these projections are at this point rough since many candidates have not been nominated, so adjustments for candidates have, in most cases, not been made). Below are the regional breakdowns (number in parenthesis represents projected seats).

National (7 Apr – 13 Apr, +/- 1.2%)
Conservative — 34.6% (122)
Liberal — 30.6% (112)
NDP — 15.5% (26)
Green — 10.0% (0)
Bloc — 8.3% (46)
Other — 1.0% (2)

Ontario (7 Apr – 13 Apr, +/- 2.0%)
Liberal — 39.0% (57)
Conservative — 33.7% (39)
NDP — 14.9% (10)
Green — 11.5% (0)
Other — 0.9% (0)

Québec (7 Apr – 13 Apr, +/- 2.3%)
Bloc — 34.3% (46)
Conservative — 23.3% (10)
Liberal — 22.0% (18)
NDP — 11.2% (0)
Green — 8.2% (0)
Other — 1.0% (1)

British Columbia (20 Mar – 13 Apr, +/- 3.1%)
Conservative — 35.3% (18)
Liberal — 27.2% (10)
NDP — 21.4% (8)
Green — 14.9% (0)
Other — 1.2% (0)

Alberta (2 Mar – 10 Apr, +/- 3.4%)
Conservative — 61.9% (28)
Liberal — 17.7% (0)
Green — 10.4% (0)
NDP — 8.4% (0)
Other — 1.6% (0)

Prairies (2 Mar – 10 Apr, +/- 3.8%)
Conservative — 42.3% (19)
Liberal — 22.9% (5)
NDP — 22.5% (4)
Green — 10.6% (0)
Other — 1.7% (0)

Atlantic Canada (16 Mar – 13 Apr, +/- 3.4%)
Liberal — 40.3% (20)
Conservative — 31.4% (8)
NDP — 20.7% (3)
Green — 7.0% (0)
Other — 0.6% (1)

Note: I will adjust these calculations as new polls are released over the next 24 hours. Last updated Tues Apr 22 @ 8:00am Pacific. Updated to include the Apr 21 Insider Advantage and Apr 21 Zogby polls.

There’s little doubt that Hillary Clinton will win Pennsylvania. The question is by how much? Cutting right to the chase, I think Pennsylvania is going to look a lot like Ohio. Factoring in the polling margin of error, Clinton could win by anywhere from 6 to 12 points, but a margin of victory of roughly 8-9 points is the most probable outcome (our projections give Clinton 53.4% and Obama 44.9%). This suggests that Clinton will win 82-87 delegates and Obama will win 69-73 delegates (thus Clinton could gain 9-18 delegates on Obama — making only a small dent in Obama’s current 140-delegate lead). How do I arrive at this? I use a weighted average of the final polls of the major pollsters conducted over the last two days (Apr 18-21).

Date	Pollster	Clinton	Obama	Diff.	Sample
4/21	Zogby	51	41	10	675
4/21	Insider Advantage	49	42	7	712
4/20	Rasmussen	49	44	5	722
4/20	Suffolk	42	52	10	600
4/20	Strategic Vision	48	41	7	576
4/20	Quinnipiac	51	44	7	1,027
4/19	ARG	54	41	13	600
4/18	Mason-Dixon	48	43	5	625

I then pro-rate these to factor in undecideds and weight them according to sample size. That gives a final projection of…

Final Projection
Hillary Clinton — 53.4% +/- 1.5% (range: 51.9% to 54.9%)
Barack Obama — 44.9% +/- 1.5% (range: 43.4% to 46.4%)

As you can see, the “average” projection shows Clinton with a margin of victory of 8.5%. Factoring in the polling margin of error of +/- 1.5%, Clinton’s best case scenario (Obama’s worst case scenario) is a margin of victory of 11.5% and Clinton’s worst case scenario (Obama’s best case scenario) is a margin of victory of 5.5%.

While the media (and certainly the Clinton campaign) will undoubtedly characterize this result as a “comeback” for Clinton, given that she was up 20 points a month ago, it looks more like Clinton “holding on” than “coming back”. Indeed, it is clear that Obama has made significant gains in a state that favors Clinton (because of the large number of 60+ voters and white working-class voters). But the data also suggests that Obama lost a small portion of his gain in the final week, likely in part due to his poor choice of words in explaining why rural voters tend to vote on social rather than economic issues (a point Clinton used to effectively label Obama as “elite” and Hillary as a “daughter of Scranton”, however improbable it may seem given Clinton’s vast wealth and Obama’s humble up-bringing). But, there is also a natural tendency to fall back on the familiar at the 11th hour in uncertain times, and it’s likely Obama would have experienced a slightly drop regardless of his comments.

So overall, I expect Clinton will gain 9-18 delegates in Pennsylvania. However, she’s likely to give back as many or more on May 6. My weighted average of North Carolina polls shows Obama with a lead of 59.0% to 39.3% — which translates into roughly 69-to-46 delegates — a pickup of 23 delegates for Obama. My weighted average of Indiana polls shows Clinton ahead 52.3% to 47.7% — translating into roughly 38-to-34 delegates — a pickup of 4 delegates for Clinton; so, Obama is currently projected to pick up 19 delegates overall on May 6. So, even with a 8-9 point win in Pennsylvania, we’re likely to end back where we started prior to Pennsylvania after May 6.

Disclaimer: DemocraticSPACE supports Barack Obama.

Note
The above calculations assume that 1.7% of people will vote for someone other than Clinton or Obama (that’s the same number as in Ohio), i.e. the Clinton/Obama numbers won’t add up to exactly 100%, but rather 98.3%. Each poll is pro-rated accordingly (this assumes the undecided vote will split relatively evenly, which may or may not be the case), then the weighted average is conducted using the pro-rated numbers (Real Clear Politics for example simply averages the raw data, so their averages will necessarily be too low). Note that the weighted averages are weighted according to sample size (Real Clear Politics just does a straight average, so all polls, regardless of their sample size are treated equally). Full Pennsylvania raw polling data can be found at Real Clear Politics. Given that it is the only poll out of the last 30+ polls that shows Obama ahead, I have not included the Apr 20 PPP poll. If the PPP poll is included, the average projection is much closer: Clinton 51.2% to Obama 47.1%.

Faced with (yet another) TTC — Toronto Transit Commission, for those not in Toronto — strike threat, Ontario Premier Dalton McGuinty raised the possibility of designating the nation’s largest transit service an “essential service”, much like police and firefighters. Frankly, McGuinty is right. Public transit is an essential service and, while I understand the desire of unionized TTC workers for better pay and working conditions, a shut-down of the TTC as a collective bargaining tactic is unacceptable.

Think back to the wildcat strike of 29 May 2006, on a day when temperatures hit 40C with the humidex (and a smog alert day no less), some TTC workers illegally walked off the job, shutting down the system, and leaving hundreds of thousands of people unable to get to work. The TTC unions ignored the cease-and-desist order issued by the Ontario Labour Relations Board, continuing the strike throughout the day.

The TTC unions also threatened strike in 2005, causing commuters to arrange alternative means of getting to work, only to call it off. The same thing happen in 2002. And in 1999, they did strike for two days before the province ordered them back-to-work. And that’s just what I can remember off the top of my head — there may have been more. And that’s on top of other public sector strikes (remember the 2002 garage strike, anyone?).

The problem is that for many, the only alternative means are either driving (and paying exorbitant parking fees) or even taking a cab. In either case, the result is a severe dent in your daily wages, in they aren’t erased altogether.

The primary reason for the current job action appears to be the usual fare — wages, benefits, etc. TTC bus drivers make $26.58 per hour or $55,286 per year (TTC management offered an inflationary raise, which was rejected). I recognize Toronto is expensive (at least relative to other parts of Ontario), but I also know a lot of teachers who make less than that, and they’ve spent a lot more time and money getting their university training than bus driver’s have. It would be nice for everyone to make more money, but there are only so many public dollars available, especially these days.

A declaration of the TTC as an essential service won’t avert a strike now, but it would in the future. Is public transit an essential service? You bet.

A plethora of new polls came out the last few days, including Segma/Unimarketing poll (Apr 9), Ipsos-Reid (Apr 10), Strategic Counsel (Apr 13), and Harris-Decima (Apr 13). Here are the latest rolling averages.

Updated: Apr 17 @ 12:50 PT

National (28 Mar – 13 Apr, +/- 1.1%)
1 Conservative — 34.6% (range: 33.5% to 35.7%) / change from 2006 election: -1.7%
2 Liberal — 30.7% (range: 29.6% to 31.8%) / change: +0.5%
3 NDP — 15.3% (range: 14.2% to 16.4%) / change: -2.2%
4 Green — 9.5% (range: 8.4% to 10.6%) / change: +5.0%
5 Bloc — 8.9% (range: 7.8% to 10.0%) / change: -1.6%

Ontario (20 Mar – 13 Apr, +/- 2.0%)
1 Liberal — 40.4% (range: 38.4% to 42.4%) / change: +0.5%
2 Conservative — 34.0% (range: 32.0% to 36.0%) / change: -1.1%
3 NDP — 14.4% (range: 12.4% to 16.4%) / change: -5.0%
4 Green — 10.3% (range: 8.3% to 12.3%) / change: +5.6%

Quebec (20 Mar – 13 Apr, +/- 2.3%)
1 Bloc — 35.6% (range: 33.3% to 37.9%) / change: -6.5%
2 Conservative — 24.0% (range: 21.7% to 26.3%) / change: -0.2%
3 Liberal — 21.9% (range: 19.6% to 24.2%) / change: +1.1%
4 NDP — 10.6% (range: 8.3% to 12.9%) / change: +3.1%
5 Green — 6.9% (range: 4.6% to 9.2%) / change: +2.9%

British Columbia (6 Mar – 10 Apr, +/- 3.3%)
1 Conservative — 38.4% (range: 35.1% to 41.7%) / change: +1.1%
2 Liberal — 26.2% (range: 22.9% to 29.5%) / change: -1.4%
3 NDP — 20.9% (range: 17.6% to 24.2%) / change: -7.7%
4 Green — 13.3% (range: 10.0% to 16.6%) / change: +8.0%

Alberta (24 Feb – 10 Apr, +/- 3.6%)
1 Conservative — 61.3% (range: 57.7% to 64.9%) / change: -3.7%
2 Liberal — 17.7% (range: 14.1% to 21.3%) / change: +2.4%
3 Green — 9.9% (range: 6.3% to 13.5%) / change: +3.4%
4 NDP — 9.5% (range: 5.9% to 13.1%) / change: -2.1%

Prairies (24 Feb – 10 Apr, +/- 4.5%)
1 Conservative — 45.5% (range: 41.0% to 50.0%) / change: -0.2%
2 Liberal — 23.3% (range: 18.8% to 27.8%) / change: -1.0%
3 NDP — 20.1% (range: 15.6% to 24.6%) / change: -4.7%
4 Green — 9.4% (range: 4.9% to 13.9%) / change: +5.5%

Atlantic Canada (16 Mar – 10 Apr, +/- 4.3%)
1 Liberal — 41.5% (range: 37.2% to 45.8%) / change: +1.2%
2 Conservative — 33.1% (range: 28.8% to 37.4%) / change: -1.0%
3 NDP — 20.6% (range: 16.3% to 24.9%) / change: -2.1%
4 Green — 4.2% (range: 0% to 8.5%) / change: +1.9%

Based on these numbers, a current ballpark estimate of seats is:

Conservative — 124 seats (0 change from 2006)
Liberal — 111 seats (+8)
Bloc — 47 seats (-4)
NDP — 22 seats (-7)
Independent — 2 seats (+1)
Green — 0 seats (0)

A close examination of the political dynamics in Canada’s various reasons helps explain why neither the Liberals, nor the Conservatives (or NDP or Bloc, for that matter) have any great desire for a spring election. Below is a region-by-region analysis of the current state of Canadian politics (quoted support levels reflect our weighted average of recent polling data).

Ontario

As of right now, the Liberals and Greens are up 1.6% and 4.5% respectively over 2006, while the Conservatives and NDP are down 1.6% and 4.5% respectively. More so than anything else, this solidifying of Liberal support in Ontario has dampened Conservative enthusiasm for a spring election. Why? Because the Conservatives won several seats by narrow margins in 2006. The small swing of 3.2% (Liberals up 1.6, Conservatives down 1.6) could result in many ridings going back to the Liberals — for example, Parry Sound-Muskoka (0.1% margin in 2006), Glengarry-Prescott-Russell (0.4%), St. Catharines (0.5%), Ottawa-Orléans (2.0%), Simcoe North (2.0%), Barrie (2.7%), Kitchener-Conestoga (2.7%), and Halton (2.8%), especially now that Garth Turner is a Liberal. Moreover, the weakening of the NDP in Ontario (to the benefit of the Greens), a swing of 7.1% (Liberals up 1.6, NDP down 4.5), could also put several NDP-held ridings back into Liberal hands — for example, Hamilton East-Stoney Creek (0.8% margin in 2006), London-Fanshawe (1.9%), Parkdale-High Park (4.5%) especially with Gerard Kennedy as the Liberal candidate, Sault Ste. Marie (4.7%), Hamilton Mountain (5.5%), and even Olivia Chow in Trinity-Spadina (5.9%). This dual dynamic — both the Conservatives and NDP falling — could result in as many as 13 seats shifting to the Liberals, 7 coming at the expense of the Conservatives and 6 at the expense of the NDP.

Québec

As of right now, the Liberals, NDP and Greens are up 2.8%, 3.1% and 1.8% respectively over 2006, while the Conservatives and Bloc Québécois are down 2.4% and 5.3% respectively. Following the poor performance of the Parti Québécois in the spring 2007 election, there is cause for concern among Bloquistes. Contrary to popular belief, however, at this point, the beneficiary of the Bloc’s fall is the Liberal Party, not the Conservatives. The Bloc won several ridings by narrow margins over the Liberals in 2006. With an 8.1% swing (Bloc down 5.3, Liberals up 2.8), it is possible that ridings such as Ahuntsic (1.7% margin in 2006), Papineau (2.2%), Brossard-La Prairie (2.2%), Jeanne-Le Ber (6.1%), and Gatineau (7.9%) could revert back to the Liberals. The Conservatives should hold the seats they won in 2006, but with a swing of just 2.9% (Bloc down 5.3, Conservatives down 2.4), they are not yet in a position to pick up additional seats. A few seats are within striking distance, given the Bloc’s falling support — Roberval–Lac-Saint-Jean (8.0% margin in 2006), Gaspésie–Îles-de-la-Madeleine (10.5%), Saint-Maurice–Saint-Champlain (11.3%), for example — but we have to see the Conservatives strengthen or the Bloc falling further for these seats to flip into the Conservative column. One big unknown is whether the NDP can hold its by-election pick-up in Outremont during a general election. History suggests that the Liberals perform much better during general elections than by-elections, but you can bet the NDP will put everything it has into holding that seat; as such, it is too close to call. The current dynamic suggests the Liberals could gain 5 or 6 seats — 5 at the expense of the Bloc and 1 at the expense of the NDP (if the NDP cannot hold Outremont).

British Columbia

The big story in B.C. is the precipitous drop of the NDP (down 7.4%), to the benefit of the Greens (up 8.5%), who are now showing a solid 13.8% support across the province. This dynamic benefits the Conservatives, who narrowly lost several ridings to the NDP in 2006. The 8.4% shift we are seeing (Conservatives up 1.0, NDP down 7.4) could put ridings such as Vancouver Island North (1.1% margin in 2006) and Burnaby-New Westminster (5.8%) back into Conservative hands. With the Liberals falling less than the NDP (2.1 versus the NDP’s 7.4), we could also see the Liberals take Burnaby-Douglas (2.6% margin in 2006), but the Liberals are also likely to lose West Vancouver-Sunshine Coast-Sea-to-Sky Country (1.5%) to the Conservatives, especially with Blair Wilson now out of the Liberal caucus. The net result suggests the Conservatives could pick up 3 additional seats, the Liberals holding the same, and the NDP losing 3 seats.

Alberta

As we might expect, there is essentially no change in Alberta. The current dynamic shows the NDP dropping 5.2%, to the benefit of the Liberals (3.2%) and the Greens (2.7%), but not enough to prevent the Conservatives from sweeping the board.

Prairies

We’re not seeing much change in the Prairies, either. The Greens are showing increased strength (up 6.6%), at the expense of both the Liberals ( down 3.3%) and NDP (down 3.3%), but this may or may not be a statistical anomaly given more limited polling data, since the Prairies — ironically — have never been fertile ground for the Greens. We would expect the Conservatives to retain the seat they picked up in the by-election (Desnethé-Missinippi-Churchill River), giving them one more than in 2006, while all others remain the same.

Atlantic Canada

Atlantic Canada continues to be an enigma for the Conservatives. Overall there isn’t much change from 2006, but with two MPs leaving the Conservative caucus in key ridings — Bill Casey having been expelled for voting against the budget (now running as an independent) and Norman Doyle retiring — the Conservatives could lose both Cumberland-Colchester-Musquodoboit Valley and St. John’s East, especially with the Liberals up 1.7% and the Conservatives down 2.7%. This 4.4% shift also could see Tobique-Mactaquac in New Brunswick (0.9% margin in 2006) fall back into Liberal hands. The net result would be a Liberal gain of 2 and one additional independent MP (Casey).

The North

We have no polling data for the North, but we don’t anticipate radical changes from 2006. With Liberal MP Nancy Karetak-Lindell retiring, we might expect a more competitive race in Nunavut, but the Liberals probably hold the seat. Overall, no change from 2006.

Overall

Although the Conservatives (down 1.3% from 2006) hold a narrow statistically-significant lead over the Liberals (up 0.6%) — overall 35.0% to 30.8%, +/- 1.4% — with the NDP down 2.6% nationally (to 14.9% +/- 1.4%), the dynamic suggests that if an election were held today, the Conservatives and Liberals could win roughly the same number of seats (115-120 seats) — in either case, a weak minority — with the NDP dropping to about 20 seats and the Bloc (down 5.3% in Québec) falling to 46, plus 2 independents. Easily the biggest gains nationally have been made by the Greens (up 4.7% — the only party with significant gains), but without any natural concentrations of support, unless the Greens can mount upsets in a few key ridings (such as Elizabeth May in Central Nova or Adriane Carr in Vancouver Centre), they could again be the hottest thing in Canadian politics, but without any seats to show for it.

Here are the latest polling numbers for the Canadian political parties, based on a weighted average of the last 5 polls, including the latest Nanos poll (Apr 9). Note that these polls are generally quite far apart (unlike immediately before or during a campaign) so we’ll need to see more frequent polling in the smaller regions to have greater confidence in the averaging. But this is where we are now…

Updated: Apr 11 @ 12:50 PT

National (16 Mar – 9 Apr, +/- 1.3%)
1 Conservative — 35.0% (range: 33.7% to 36.3%) / change from 2006 election: -1.3%
2 Liberal — 30.8% (range: 29.5% to 32.1%) / change: +0.6%
3 NDP — 14.9% (range: 13.6% to 16.2%) / change: -2.6%
4 Green — 9.2% (range: 7.9% to 10.5%) / change: +4.7%
5 Bloc — 9.2% (range: 7.9% to 10.5%) / change: -1.3%

Ontario (16 Mar – 9 Apr, +/- 2.3%)
1 Liberal — 41.3% (range: 39.0% to 43.6%) / change: +1.4%
2 Conservative — 33.2% (range: 30.9% to 35.5%) / change: -1.9%
3 NDP — 14.8% (range: 12.5% to 17.1%) / change: -4.6%
4 Green — 9.1% (range: 6.8% to 11.4%) / change: +4.4%

Quebec (16 Mar – 9 Apr, +/- 2.9%)
1 Bloc — 36.8% (range: 33.9% to 39.7%) / change: -5.3%
2 Liberal — 23.6% (range: 20.7% to 26.5%) / change: +2.8%
3 Conservative — 22.2% (range: 19.3% to 25.1%) / change: -2.0%
4 NDP — 10.6% (range: 7.7% to 13.5%) / change: +3.1%
5 Green — 5.8% (range: 2.9% to 8.7%) / change: +1.8%

British Columbia (6 Mar – 30 Mar, +/- 3.9%)
1 Conservative — 38.3% (range: 34.4% to 42.2%) / change: +1.0%
2 Liberal — 25.5% (range: 21.6% to 29.4%) / change: -2.1%
3 NDP — 21.2% (range: 17.3% to 25.1%) / change: -7.4%
4 Green — 13.8% (range: 9.9% to 17.7%) / change: +8.5%

Alberta (6 Mar – 28 Mar, +/- 4.5%)
1 Conservative — 64.3% (range: 59.8% to 68.8%) / change: -0.7%
2 Liberal — 18.5% (range: 14.0% to 23.0%) / change: +3.2%
3 Green — 9.2% (range: 4.7% to 13.7%) / change: +2.7%
4 NDP — 6.4% (range: 1.9% to 10.9%) / change: -5.2%

Prairies (24 Feb – 28 Mar, +/- 5.8%)
1 Conservative — 45.7% (range: 39.9% to 51.5%) / change: 0%
2 NDP — 21.5% (range: 15.7% to 27.3%) / change: -3.3%
3 Liberal — 21.1% (range: 15.3% to 26.9%) / change: -3.2%
4 Green — 10.5% (range: 4.7% to 16.3%) / change: +6.6%

Atlantic Canada (16 Mar – 9 Apr, +/- 5.5%)
1 Liberal — 41.6% (range: 36.1% to 47.1%) / change: +1.3%
2 Conservative — 31.8% (range: 26.3% to 37.3%) / change: -2.3%
3 NDP — 20.8% (range: 15.3% to 26.3%) / change: -1.9%
4 Green — 5.3% (range: 0% to 10.8%) / change: +3.0%