9:58PM
DemocraticSPACE has seen enough. With just over 10% of the vote reporting, we believe that the NDP’s Thomas Mulcair will win Outremont. The race may tighten up, but the trend is clear.

9:58PM - POLLS REPORTING: 60/168
NDP / MULCAIR / 3335 / 48.4%
LIB / COULON / 2000 / 29.0%
BQ / GILSON / 636 / 9.2%
CPC / DUGUAY / 606 / 8.8%
GRN / PILON / 175 / 2.5%

Stay tuned…

So who is going to win Outremont today? The short answer is I have no idea (but it’s surely going to be either NDPer Thomas Mulcair or Liberal Jocelyn Coulon). Unlike general elections, where the vast majority of people vote by party (about 65% by party + 20% by party leader), by-elections are driven by the particular circumstances and personalities, because the government is not on the line, and often people like to send parties a message on specific issues.

What makes Outremont so interesting is that the NDP have recruited a well-known former Liberal cabinet minister as their candidate, in a riding that has voted Liberal since everyone can remember. Outremont is a pretty progressive riding, and includes part of the Plateau, my former neighborhood. There are a lot of well-established Jewish families and a growing number of nouveau riche, a younger group of affluent francophones. It is this latter group that has changed the make-up of the riding, to the point where it is no longer a safe Liberal seat. Indeed, the nouveau riche will determine the outcome of this by-election, since most of the traditional Liberal support will vote Liberal. The only question here is whether or not the Liberals have enough of their typically strong ground campaign to get out the vote. This is often very difficult in by-elections, and for that reason, Liberals tend not to do well in by-elections. This has much less to do with Stephane Dion’s leadership (as the mainstream media would like everyone to believe) as it does with the fact that the government is not on the line. The stakes are simply not that high for traditional Liberal voters.

What is clear is that many of the nouveau riche want to send the Bloc Quebecois a message that their progressive vote should not be taken for granted. Indeed, the BQ polled 29% here in 2006 and last week’s poll put them at just 14%. The NDP’s policy positions on many issues are not dissimilar to the Bloc, so it’s very likely that the NDP will receive the backing of a good number of Bloc voters. Given that this by-election won’t impact the BQ’s standing in parliament, many might be inclined to vote NDP this time.

A poll from last week showed Mulcair up 38-32 over Coulon. However, we also know that Quebec polls consistently under-estimate the Liberal vote by roughly 4 points. We also know the NDP is typically over-estimated by a couple points (as some Quebecers park their vote with the NDP). So the poll tells me that the Liberals and NDP were both really around 36% support last week. The NDP is out in full force, as a break-through in Quebec would be huge for the party. So, I don’t think the Liberals have an advantage on the ground this time.

It will be interesting to see how the two-person race impacts the votes of other parties. Quebecers like to vote for a winner. So expect the Conservatives and Bloc votes to drop even further. In fact, the Greens might even out-poll the Conservatives. If I were to venture a guess — and it is purely a guess, I might peg support at roughly:

COULON — 36-38%
MULCAIR — 36-38%
GILSON — 11-13%
PILON — 6-8%
DUGUAY — 6-8%
OTHERS — < 1% each

But in by-elections, it's anybody's game. Tell us what you think -- go to our OUTREMONT BY-ELECTION page.

Three of Ontario’s four parties have taken a clear stand on the issue of religious education funding. Dalton McGuinty’s Liberals (note: 538kb PDF file, p) support the status quo, which includes public funding for separate (Catholic) schools, home to 1/3 of Ontario’s students. John Tory’s Progressive Conservatives supports public funding of all private religious schools. Frank de Jong’s Greens support a single, secular public system, merging separate school boards with their public counterparts. But, to this point, Howard Hampton’s NDP has been strangely silent on the issue (indeed, with the writ set to drop tomorrow, the NDP has not yet released a platform or launched a campaign website, as the other parties have done). The last I heard, NDP party policy was in support of the status quo. Perhaps NDP supporters can explain what is going on.

I find it puzzling why the NDP has been silent on what is quickly turning into the defining issue of the campaign. Moreover, I find it odd that they have not taken a position similar to Greens. Indeed, party ideology/values would appear to support the Green position of a single public, secular system of school boards. Many of its members share this view. In fact, some local campaigns are ever promoting this alternative in the absence of a clear party position.

While the Greens have little to lose by calling for the abolishment of Catholic school boards — they can only improve upon their 2.8% support from 2003 by broadening their platform and appeal — such a call by the NDP does run the risk of alienating the 1/3 of parents whose children attend Catholic schools.

Still, strategically, adopting the Green position would provide the NDP with a position consistent with its values and a majority of its members views. And it would give Ontarians a clear alternative to the Liberal and PC positions, while preventing the Greens from siphoning some support from this issue (which might well happen if people feel strongly enough about it). In fact, without a clear position on the religious education funding issue, a greater risk for the NDP is that the election becomes a two-way race between the Liberals and Progressive Conservatives around this ballot question (after all, if the NDP and Liberal positions are the same on this issue, many prospective NDPers may opt to vote Liberal to prevent what they see as a dangerous result should the PCs form the next government). A bold alternative might be necessary just for the NDP to stay in the game…

Canadians are often proud that their political processes are not dominated by the vast amounts of money spent to influence voters in the United States. But Canadians would also be naive to think that money doesn’t influence performance here in Canada. So while our campaign finance laws limit the total money spent, it still plays a big role.

I will offer one example. Take a look at what was arguably the most competitive province in 2006 — British Columbia. Here is a comparison of the average money spent per riding and the average votes received per riding.

The Greens easily had the best bang for the buck spent — with each vote costing just $1.30. This differs considerably from the other three major parties, which ranged from about $2.98 for the NDP to $3.88 for the Conservatives. The Liberals were in the middle at $3.34 per vote.

Put another way — the Conservatives spent 21 times what the Greens did and received 7 times more votes. The NDP spent over 12 times more and the Liberals spent over 13 times more and both received about 5 times more votes.

It really begs the question: how well would the Greens do if they were as well funded as the Conservatives, Liberals and NDP?

Hats off to Paul Ferreira, NDP MPP-elect in York South-Weston. He is a good example of why perseverance pays in politics. I will admit that I was surprised that he won — despite the 40-point margin of victory in 2003, I figured it was going to be close, but I didn’t think he could put it off. But he did — by a razor thin 1.9% margin. So congratulations to Paul and his team.

Paul first ran as the 1997 federal NDP candidate in Brampton Centre, where he finished fourth behind the Liberals, Reform and PCs, capturing just 8% of the vote. Seven years later he was the NDP candidate in York South-Weston, finishing a distant second with 21% of the vote, almost 40 points behind Liberal winner Alan Tonks. He again ran last January against Tonks, with a virtual repeat performance, gaining 21% of the vote versus Tonks’ 57%. He then tried his luck in municipal politics last fall, running for a council seat in Toronto’s Ward 11, where he had a respectable second place finish behind incumbent Francis Nunziata, gaining 37% to Nunziata’s 50%. But his fifth attempt, Ferreira was victorious.

So, for all of the candidates who have tried and come up short, remember the words of advice that Ferreira is sure to pass along: perseverance pays in politics.

Lucille Broadbent, wife of former NDP leader Ed Broadbent, has died at 71, after a lengthy battle with cancer. Ed did the right thing in choosing not to run in the January 2006 election, instead leaving politics to spent time with Lucille. Our deepest sympathies go out to Ed and the rest of the Broadbent family.

NDP Greener Homes Strategy Misses the Point
By Gregory D. Morrow

The NDP released Part 1 (”Greener Homes Strategy”) of its 5-part Green Agenda for Canada today. I applaud the NDP for making energy efficiency an issue at the Federal level. At this point, they are the only party seriously making noise on environmental issues in Ottawa, although that could change depending on the outcome of the Liberal leadership race. So far, the Conservatives have taken a page out of the Bush administration’s book — i.e. do nothing, and the Bloc Quebecois sold themselves out for a promise that Quebec would be taken care of “later”.

Unfortunately, the NDP plan isn’t very well thought out — and I say that as a progressive architect, urban designer, and urban planner who is very interested in promoting such a “Green Agenda for Canada”. Here is what the NDP proposes:

- Development of an advanced energy efficiency program to help make Canadian homes the most efficient in the world;
- Amendment of the National Building Code to legislate lower energy use in new homes;
- Making mandatory, in order to qualify for the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation’s Mortgage Insurance Program, proof of compliance with the new National Building Code’s energy efficiency provisions for new homes AND Establishing or enhancing other programs to assist Canadians in retrofitting older homes so as to meet the new energy standards;
- Requiring that all appliances and lighting sold in Canada meet the Energy Star standards; and
- Re-instatement of the EnerGuide program abolished by the Conservatives.

(more…)

NDP Must Return to Grassroots Organizing
By Gregory D. Morrow

In his classic study Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy (New York: Free Press, [1911] 1962) [Note: 891kb PDF] Robert Michels argues that “organization is the weapon of the weak in the struggle with the strong” but also that “organization is … the source from which the conservative currents flow over the plain of democracy, occasioning there disastrous floods and rendering the plain unrecognizable.” ([1911] 1962, pp. 61-62; or pp. 19-20 in above PDF). In other words, any attempt to achieve social/political change will ultimately result in a form of organization that mimicks the very institutional structure it hopes to change. The logic, as summarized by Elisabeth Clemens in her 1993 article “Organizational Repertoires and Institutional Change: Women’s Groups and the Transformation of U.S. Politics, 1890-1920,” [The American Journal of Sociology, (98):3, pp. 755-98] [Note: 2.4mb PDF] is as follows:

1) hierarchical, centralized bureaucracies are the most effective form of organization;
2) consequently, existing political parties and institutions have adopted this form of organization;
3) in the course of pursuing their ends, oppositional parties will adopt the same organizational form for strategic reasons, even at the expense of their ideological commitments;
4) therefore, [this] will lead oppositional parties to become like established political groups, precluding the possibility of meaningful political change. (Clemens, 1993, p. 768)

This is precisely the paradox in which Canada’s New Democratic Party finds itself. A party whose origins are clearly tied to a populist and grassroots social movement has come to mimick the organizational structure of Canada’s two major parties — a centralized, bureaucratic and hierarchical structure that is viewed as the most effective means of organizing political action.

And this NDP centralization of policy and organization has not been without its successes when the Party finds itself with the balance of power in minority governments - a position that the NDP has enjoyed on a few occasions in its 40-year history. But Michels’ thesis illustrates the paradox faced by social movements such as the one that created the CCF-NDP.

In particular, he contends that by competing in elections, oppositional parties that are organized centrally would be drawn toward the political center and, thereby, moderate their radical goals. And if such actions don’t yield positive electoral results, he suggests that a party would subsequently adopt strategies that emphasize ideological purity or solidary rather than electoral advantage (1962, pp. 334-5). As Elisabeth Clemens explains, for a centrally organized revolutionary party, “the requirements of training cadres may well outweigh the advantages of a large membership” (1993, p. 766).

The NDP clearly suffers from this unfortunate paradox — a party of social change whose electoral results have never quite matched their high expectations (or popular support), which subsequently leads to a period of soul-searching in which the party seeks to differentiate itself further from its closest ideological rival, the Liberals. This cycle repeats more or less consistently following each election.

I would argue that this period of self-reflection would be more fruitful if, instead of it re-evaluating policy positions, the NDP re-evaluated the organizational structure through which party policy and campaign strategies are formulated. In a nutshell, I would argue that because the NDP has co-opted the hierarchical organizational structure of bureaucratic and centralized institutions (those used by the very political and corporate elites they hope to supplant), it has become not more, but less, effective at mobilizing its supporters. This leads inevitably to electoral disappointment.

To be sure, the NDP suffers from the injustices of an electoral system that necessitates concentrations of support over broad-based support, and surely the NDP must continue to fight for electoral reform to redress how votes are translated into seats. Yet the NDP executive must also re-examine its own institutional structure and ask itself whether a more decentralized, regional, issue-targeted and bottom-up organization wouldn’t be more effective at electing members to fight for progressive values. In other words, the current top-down structure — where policies are set by a central executive (and voted upon by the chosen few delegates who are allowed to attend the party convention) — represents a significant departure from the grassroots movement that gave birth to the Party.

Through a careful study of women’s groups in the late nineteenth/early twentieth centuries, Clemens demonstrates the effectiveness of women organizers in achieving social change precisely not by adopting a centralized hierarchical organizational structure but by drawing upon a multiplicity (a repertoire) of strategies that mobilized support around specific issues. The progressive movement of today could learn much from the women’s movement of the late nineteenth/early twentieth century. Clemens argues convincingly that “the chosen model of collective action shapes alliances with other groups and relations with political institutions.” (p. 771). For the NDP to offer Canadians a real alternative in Canadian politics, they must strive to return to a grassroots bottom-up form of organization.

I suggested in an October 5, 2005 article that the NDP adopt a “charrette” process to develop party policies - a process that has been pioneered in the urban planning field but has vast potential for arriving at solutions to broader issues of public policy. Feel free to read that article:

http://democraticspace.com/blog/2005/10/ndp-strategy-part-iii-develop-party-policies-from-the-grassroots/

This charrette process of policy formation and political organization would go a long way towards raising the profile of the NDP in local communities and illustrating to the population that a vote for the NDP is a vote for real change. Of course, this will necessitate a reversal of years of technocratic public policy analysis that has been characterized by “modern” methods. But it is necessary in order to engage citizens in crafting solutions to problems of the day. Increasing political participation cannot be limited to increasing the voter turnout at election time. It must strive to engage citizens between elections as well. One point of clarification: given that most voters (about 60-65%) cast their ballot on the basis of the party, rather than by party leader (20-25%) or local candidate (15-20%), it is important to recognize that the fate of local candidates is in large measure tied to the fate of the national campaign. The charrette process to which I refer is not meant primarily to address local issues (even though at its roots it is a local process), but rather what I am suggesting is adapting the charrette model to engage citizens in the formation of federal NDP policy - the full range of national issues from healthcare, to the environment, taxes, education, foreign policy, etc.

The recent defection and subsequent cabinet appointment of Liberal David Emerson to the Conservative cabinet (perverting the democratic will of constituents of Vancouver-Kingsway) and the appointment of the unelected Michael Fortier as Minister of Public Works (the department synonymous with the Sponsorship scandal) illustrates the undemocratic nature of the bureaucratic and centralized organizational structure of Canada’s elites.

If the NDP is to differentiate itself from the other main parties, it will not be on the basis of policy; rather, it will be on the way that policies and strategies are formed. In this, the NDP has the power to control its destiny. A return to grassroots through a charrette process of policy formation and political organization will send a message of real change, creating a platform that is not only for the people, but crafted by the people. Heeding the warning that Michels issued a century ago, and learning from the experiences that Clemens outlines from the women’s movement, the NDP’s best chances are in returning to grassroots organizing. It is through de-centralized, regional, and issue-specific organization, not through centralized, hierarchical and bureaucratic organization that progressive organizations such as the NDP can become, as Michels suggested, “the weapon of the weak in the struggle with the strong”.

Note: the two PDFs linked to this page (Michels and Clemens) are under copyright. By downloading them, you agree not to distribute or reproduce them in any form.

NDP Wrong to Expel Buzz Hargrove
By Gregory D. Morrow

The Ontario NDP has expelled Canadian Auto Workers Union President Buzz Hargrove from the party, revoking the party membership that he has held for 41 years, ostensibly because he told voters in the federal election to “vote Liberal where the NDP cannot win.” (in other words: vote NDP, but where they cannot win, vote Liberal). I believe his expulsion is a both a strategic and democratic mistake. One must seriously question the purpose of expelling a prominent — and arguably very influential — party member such as Hargrove.

On first glance, it appears to be a case of sour grapes. Orthodox NDPers cringed when Hargrove and Paul Martin appeared together during the election. Kicking him out of the party appears to be their way of achieving retributive justice. And while it might make the party executive feel better, ejecting the leader of the nation’s largest union without letting him know of their potential actions or giving him a chance to defend himself will almost certainly cost them union votes.

Hargrove was kicked out for endorsing strategic voting — voting for your second choice (in this case, Liberal) where it is apparent that your first choice (NDP) cannot win. As I’ve said many times, strategic voting is problematic, but it is a reality given our flawed first-past-the-post system. The federal NDP had the opportunity to use its leverage in the 38th parliament to demand electoral reform in exchange for its support. It choose not to, instead asking for a vague covenant from the Liberals to block private healthcare (to me, the whole charade ended up looking like an election ploy to paint the Liberals as pro-private healthcare). In light of the NDP not insisting on a more representative electoral system, people like Hargrove fell back on strategic voting in order to maximize the party’s chances to gain seats (and to minimize the Tory chances to gain seats).

Moreover, it is not surprising that Hargrove would want to work with the Liberals. Only the Liberals or Conservatives had (or have) enough broad-base support in all regions in order to form the government. The NDP is not there yet. The Conservatives have said explicitly they would cut all corporate subsidies. The Liberals, by contrast, are willing to work with Ford, Chrysler, GM, among others, to ensure the survival of Canadian auto plants. So, it is in the interest of Hargrove and his constitutents (Canadian Auto Workers) to block the Tories. Buzz was, quite simply, doing his job. If a Conservative government cuts off incentives to the big three, and people lose their jobs, how does that benefit the NDP? Hargrove wanted want all many NDPers wanted: a Liberal-NDP minority government.

Further still, Hargrove’s endorsement of strategic voting worked both ways. Yes, he endorsed voting Liberal in ridings where the NDP had no chance of winning. But, there is evidence to suggest that Liberals also voted strategically for the NDP. Take Edmonton-Strathcona, for example. If voters here followed the pattern in Alberta, the results would have been: Tories 43%, NDP 26%, Liberals 22%. However, a strong candidate (Linda Duncan) and strategic voting tilted the vote slightly more towards the NDP. The final results were: Tories 42%, NDP 32%, Liberals 18%. Thus, it could be surmised that 1 in 6 Liberals strategically voted for the NDP. The NDP didn’t win, but they certainly made it competitive. Overall, DemocraticSPACE projected the NDP to win 29 seats. They won 29 seats. I see no evidence to suggest the NDP lost seats due to strategic voting.

The bigger question in the fallout of Hargrove’s explusion is whether the NDP can tolerate a diversity of voices within its ranks. Hargrove supported the NDP and its policies. But, he also recognized the need to block the Tories. For this, he lost his membership. His ejection follows on the NDP stripping Bev Desjarlais of her critic portfolio for not voting in favour of gay marriage last year (and subsequently, she lost the Churchill nomination — the seat was, in turn, won by Liberal Tina Keeper). Many NDP members felt very strongly that Bev should be kicked out of the party for not supporting a basic human right like marriage. She was labeled a bigot and vilified. I certainly think you can disagree with Bev’s decision to vote against gay marriage, but the rabid response, officially and among the membership, suggests an organization that not only expects but demands an orthodox endorsement of all party policies, all the time. I wonder whether this demand is consistent with the basic tenets of democracy, which is advanced through the genuine debate of issues.

The ejection of Desjarlais and Hargrove raises questions about the degree of dissent allowed within the NDP. For example, would a community organizer working to deliver more affordable housing be vilified if he or she suggested the best means of achieving that is by providing incentives to developers (a point that the evidence supports)? In this case, the policy of fighting for more affordable housing is consistent with the NDP’s aims, but the means of achieving that outcome — working through private means — does not. Would a public transit advocate be vilified for supporting Toronto’s Pearson-Union Station rail link, even if it meant adversely affecting the taxicab union or going against the adjacent community because they don’t want the noise? Or what about a community activist who supports setting up a private (but non-profit) health facility? Certainly the non-profit status would be supported by most NDPers, but there are those within the party that see any delivery of health services outside the public sector as a betrayal of the faith. The point here is not to criticize the NDP, but to raise legitimate questions about the inherent tension between the party apparatus and the principles of democracy (which should be of particular import to a party called the New DEMOCRATIC Party). Democracy is the free expression of differences of opinion. But when opinions don’t necessarily match 100% with party policy, is it acceptable to expel those who hold those dissenting views?

These are not easy questions. Yet the expulsion of Canadian Auto Worker President Buzz Hargrove does little but satisfy the more vindictive elements within the party. The message is clear: stay on message or get out. Surely, democracy deserves better. And surely the New Democratic Party can do better.

The final STRATEGIC VOTING GUIDES are now available. Strategic Voting occurs when voters cast their ballot for their second choice party to prevent a less favourable party from winning.

In order for a riding to qualify for strategic voting, we feel 3 conditions must be met:
1. It must be a close 2-way race (i.e. the two other parties must be within 5%)
2. Your party’s chances of winning riding are remote (i.e. support < 25%)
3. Small number of votes will make a difference (i.e. < 1 in 3 voters).

FINAL NDP STRATEGIC VOTING GUIDE (PDF Version)
There are 35 ridings where strategic voting might be effective for NDP supporters:
1. ST. CATHARINES (ON)
2. PETERBOROUGH (ON)
3. BRAMALEA-GORE-MALTON (ON)
4. WEST NOVA (NS)
5. WINNIPEG SOUTH CENTRE (MB)
6. SAINT JOHN (NB)
7. OTTAWA SOUTH (ON)
8. MIRAMICHI (NB)
9. BURLINGTON (ON)
10. OUTREMONT (QC)
11. ETOBICOKE-LAKESHORE (ON)
12. NORTHUMBERLAND-QUINTE WEST (ON)
13. BRAMPTON WEST (ON)
14. WINNIPEG SOUTH (MB)
15. OTTAWA-ORLEANS (ON)
16. KITCHENER-CONESTOGA (ON)
17. FREDERICTON (NB)
18. BRANT (ON )
19. HALTON (ON)
20. MISSISSAUGA-STREETSVILLE (ON)
21. MISSISSAUGA SOUTH (ON)
22. BOURASSA (QC)
23. PONTIAC (QC)
24. BROSSARD-LA PRAIRIE (QC)
25. WEST VANCOUVER-SUNSHINE COAST (BC)
26. NORTH VANCOUVER (BC)
27. TOBIQUE-MACTAQUAC (NB)
28. PARRY SOUND-MUSKOKA (ON)
29. LONDON NORTH CENTRE (ON)
30. MISSISSAUGA-ERINDALE (ON)
31. EDMONTON CENTRE (AB)
32. REGINA-LUMSDEN-LAKE CENTRE (SK)
33. SAINT BONIFACE (MB)
34. KINGS-HANTS (NS)
35. AVALON (NL)

FINAL CONSERVATIVE STRATEGIC VOTING GUIDE (PDF Verison)
There are 21 ridings were strategic voting might be effective:
1. PARKDALE-HIGH PARK (ON)
2. BEACHES-EAST YORK (ON)
3. BROSSARD-LA PRAIRIE (QC)
4. BOURASSA (QC)
5. VANCOUVER CENTRE (BC)
6. OTTAWA CENTRE (ON)
7. ESQUIMALT-JUAN DE FUCA (BC)
8. VANCOUVER -KINGSWAY (BC)
9. TRINITY-SPADINA (ON)
10. JEANNE-LE BER (QC)
11. LASALLE-EMARD (QC)
12. ALGOMA-MANITOULIN-KAPUSKASING (ON)
13. SUDBURY (ON )
14. THUNDER BAY-SUPERIOR NORTH (ON)
15. TIMMINS-JAMES BAY (ON)
16. YUKON (YT)
17. VICTORIA (BC)
18. OUTREMONT (QC)
19. HALIFAX (NS)
20. DAVENPORT (ON)
21. WESTERN ARCTIC (NT)

FINAL LIBERAL STRATEGIC VOTING GUIDE (PDF Version)
There are 13 ridings were strategic voting might be effective:
1. VANCOUVER ISLAND NORTH (BC)
2. OSHAWA (ON)
3. MEGANTIC-L’ERABLE (QC)
4. SKEENA-BULKLEY VALLEY (BC)
5. PONTIAC (QC)
6. PITT MEADOWS-MAPLE RIDGE-MISSION (BC)
7. BEAUPORT-LIMOILOU (QC)
8. NANAIMO-ALBERNI (BC)
9. PALLISER (SK)
10. LEVIS-BELLECHASSE (QC)
11. JONQUIERE-ALMA (QC)
12. COMPTON-STANSTEAD (QC)
13. RICHMOND-ARTHABASKA (QC)